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A middle aged man anxiously awaits the results from the expensive in vitro
fertilization' process with his wife, uncertain whether the procedure worked this
time.2 A young woman frets that she is a carrier of Tay-Sachs3 and will pass this
disease to her unborn baby.4 A twelve year-old boy listens intently, displaying
unusual maturity, as his doctor explains a new treatment for his terminal heart
disease to his parents.5 A newborn fills her lungs, preparing to issue her first cry,
unaware of the congenital defect which will shorten her life.6 Each of these
people could benefit from embryological research.7 Embryological research may
1. See NAT'L INST. OFHEALTH, REPORTOFTHEHUMANEMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL D-6 (Sept. 1994)
[hereinafter NIH REPORT] (defining "in vitro fertilization" as a reproductive procedure which assists parents
in reproduction through fertilization outside of the womb); infra notes 28-34 and accompanying text
(describing the in vitro fertilization process); see also Richard P. Dickey, The Medical Status of the Embryo,
32 LoY. L. REV. 317, 323-24 (1986) (discussing the history of in vitro fertilization). The first child born
through in vitro fertilization occurred in England during 1978, and the first successful use of in vitro fertili-
zation in the United States occurred in 1981. Id.
2. In vitro fertilization is an uncertain, risky and costly procedure. See Bonnie Steinbock, Ethical
Issues in Human Embryo Research, in 2 PAPERS COMMISSIONED FOR THE HUM. EMBRYO RES. PANEL, NAT'L
INST. OF HEALTH 27 (1994) (stating that success rates may creep as high as the mid-30% range, though the
average success rate is between 12% and 20%); id. at 33 (discussing the expense of in vitro fertilization, from
$5000 to $12,000 per attempt); Kim Schaefer, Comment, In-vitro Fertilization, Frozen Embryos and the Right
to Privacy-Are Mandatory Donation Laws Constitutional, 22 PAC. LJ. 87, 91 (1990) (noting that, according
to the Office of Technological Assessment's infertility report to Congress in 1988, in vitro fertilization
procedures have resulted in pregnancies only 17% of the time and in live births only 11% of the time); Kathryn
Dor6 Perkins, More Infertile Couples Placing Hope in Clinics, SACRAMENTO BEE, Jan. 1, 1996, at Al (stating
that in vitro fertilization results in childbirth only 18% of the time, but that clients are increasingly willing to
pay $10,000 to $60,000 for a chance at giving birth as evidenced by a 133% increase in the number of
infertility clinics). See generally Dickey, supra note 1, at 330-32 (discussing more fully the success rates as
of 1986).
3. See RICHARD SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND ANNOTATED MEDICAL LEGAL DICTIONARY 216
(1987) [hereinafter SLOANE] (defining 'Tay-Sachs" as an infantile form of cerebral sphingolipidosis resulting
from defective lipid metabolism, a recessive genetic trait which typically manifests itself in people of
Ashkenazic Jewish decent and is characterized by degeneration of the brain cells, progressive dementia,
progressive vision loss which leads to blindness, paralysis, and death).
4. Albert Gore, Jr. & Steve Owens, The Challenge ofBiotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 336,
352 (1985); see id. (noting that gene therapy can provide a cure for this genetic disease).
5. John C. Fletcher & Kenneth J. Ryan, Federal Regulations for Fetal Research: A Case for Reform,
15 LAW, MED. & HEALTH CARE 126, 131-32 (1987); see id. (suggesting that fetal organ transplantation shows
promise of saving infants and children who are dying from heart, liver, or kidney disease, but noting that more
experimentation is needed).
6. Id. at 132; Larry Thompson, Cell Test Before Implant Helps Ensure Healthy "Test Tube" Baby,
WASH. POST, Apr. 27, 1992, at A3; see id. (noting that further research with embryos would enable diagnosis
of genetic defects at the earliest possible stage).
7. Jonathan Van Blerkom, The History, Current Status and Future Direction of Research Involving
Human Embryos, in 2 PAPERS COMMISSIONED FOR THE HUM. EMBRYO RES. PANEL, NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH
1, 2-6 (1994); see id. at 13-20 (discussing the implications of embryological research in a variety of areas,
including reproduction, discovery of genetic disorders, and cell line development); see also NAT'L INST. OF
HEALTH, DEVELOPMENT OF NIH GUIDELINES GOVERNING RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION AND THE PREIMPLANTATION EMBRYO (1995) [hereinafter NIH GUIDELINES] (noting that the
National Institute of Health's (NIH's) Embryo Research Panel discussed benefits of embryological research,
including advances in the treatment of infertility, pregnancy loss, birth defects, and cancer; development of
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lead to better in vitro fertilization techniques, cures for fatal diseases, prevention
of congenital defects, or allow parents to make reproductive decisions regarding
abortion.8
Embryological research is conducted in many countries worldwide, 9 but using
embryos for research in the United States is restricted in several states. 10 However
President Clinton supports changes in federal policy regarding the use of embryos
in research projects." While changes in the political climate surrounding embryo-
preimplantation diagnosis of genetic and chromosomal abnormalities; contraception innovations; and research
on embryonic stem cells which could lead to therapeutic treatments of degenerative diseases of nervous and
muscular systems); NAT'L INST. OFHEALTH, HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND PREIMPLANTATION EIBRYO
RESEARCH 3-4 (1995) [hereinafter NIH RESEARCH] (listing various areas which could benefit from research
with embryos, including fertility and the tremendous costs of alternative infertility treatments; birth defects;
repeated miscarriages; contraception; cell growth, particularly as it relates to cancer research; preimplantation
diagnosis; and transplantation methods); NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at D-4 (defining an "embryo" as the early
developing organism from the time of fertilization until the eighth week of gestation, at which time the
organism becomes a fetus); infra note 15 and accompanying text (defining the term "embryological research");
infra notes 136-93 and accompanying text (describing the various embryological research procedures which
are regulated under state laws). See generally NIH REPORT, supra, at 7-30 (providing a detailed analysis of
areas where embryological research would be useful). This Comment will use the terms "embryo,"
"preembryo," and "preimplantation embryo" interchangeably. See RICHARD SLOANE, THE SLOANE-DORLAND
ANNOTATED MEDICAL LEGAL DICTIONARY 213 (Supp. 1992) [hereinafter SLOANE Supv.] (defining "embryo"
as the cluster of cells after the second week of embryonic development after fertilization, until the end of the
seventh or eighth week); see also NIH REPORT, supra, at D-6 (describing the "preimplantation embryo" as the
very early, free-floating embryo prior to implantation in the mother's womb, within 12 to 14 days of
fertilization); Id. (equating the "preembryo" to the "preimplantation embryo"). Many courts recognize
fertilization as the moment an embryo exists. See, e.g., Renslow v. Mennonite Hosp., 367 N.E.2d 1250, 1254
(11. 1977); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93, 96 (Pa. 1960). "Conceptus" will be used to denote both the
embryonic and fetal stages of development. SLOANE, supra note 3, at 159 (describing "conceptus" as a
fertilized egg, from the moment of fertilization through birth).
8. Human Embryo Transfer: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations and Oversight of the
House Comm. on Science and Technology, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 58 (1984) (statement of G. Hodgen, Ph.D.);
NIH RESEARCH, supra note 7, at 3-4; Martin L. Lagod & Patricia A. Martin, The Human Preembryo, the
Progenitors, and the State: Toward a Dynamic Theory of Status, Rights, and Research Policy, 5 HIGH TECH.
L.J. 257, 292 (1990); see John A. Robertson, Embryos, Families, and Procreative Liberty: The Legal Structure
of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. REv. 939, 951 (1986) (suggesting that the "window of opportunity"
for examination and alteration of the embryo provided by external conception is of great importance); Barbara
Gregoratos, Note, Tempest in the Laboratory: Medical Research on Spare Embryos from In Vitro Fertilization,
37 HASTINGS L.J. 977, 978-79 (1986) (listing current and possible embryological research projects). See
generally NAT'L INST. OF HEALTH, HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND PREIMPLANTATION EMBRYO
RESEARCH (1995) (providing a list of various people who might benefit from embryological research).
9. Embryological research is conducted and supported in the United Kingdom, Canada, Spain, and
Sweden, while Australia, Austria, Denmark, France, Switzerland, and Germany permit limited research. NIH
RESEARCH, supra note 7, at 5; Lori B. Andrews & Nanette Elster, Cross-Cultural Analysis of Policies
Regarding Embryo Research, in 2 PAPERS COMMISSIONED FOR THE HUM. EMBRYO RES. PANEL, NAT'L INST.
OF HEALTH 51, 53 (1994). Norway prohibits all research involving embryos. NIH RESEARCH, supra note 7,
at 5; Andrews & Elster, supra, at 53. See generally Andrews & Elster, supra, at 51-296 (examining the
scientific policies of various countries and how these policies relate to embryological research).
10. See infra notes 118-93 and accompanying text (listing state laws which regulate or prohibit
embryological procedures).
11. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (describing a press release that discussed the President's
endorsement of embryological research).
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logical research in the United States has not affected the lack of federal funding
at this point, the shifting focus on embryological research warrants an exami-
nation of state laws.12 As society begins to accept procedures that use human
embryos for research and reproductive purposes, leading to a greater need for
these procedures, particular attention should be directed toward the constitu-
tionality of restrictive state laws. Constitutional issues which affect embryological
research include the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy and the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech as expanded to ensure the right to gather
knowledge through research.
13
This Comment will examine the constitutionality of state bans on embryo-
logical research.'4 This Comment advocates embryological procedures 5 on eggs
fertilized outside the uterus, prior to the appearance of the primitive
streak 6 -within fourteen days of embryonic development after fertilization-
often termed preimplantation embryos.17 The primitive streak is a potent indicator
because cell division, until the primitive streak appears, is devoted to the
production of the embryonic sac, the umbilical cord, and the placenta.' 8
Additionally, without the embryonic disc, axis, and primitive streak, the embryo
cannot experience pain, is not sentient, and has no brain activity. 9
12. Notwithstanding the presence of public funding, analyzing state laws is important given the
significant amount of private research. See Michael D. Davidson, Note, First Amendment Protection for
Biomedical Research, 19 ARIZ. L. REv. 893, 909 n.120 (1977) (noting that 44% of all research in 1971 was
funded privately).
13. See infra notes 212-462 and accompanying text (arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment and the
First Amendment protect the right to perform certain embryological procedures).
14. See infra notes 194-462 and accompanying text (proposing that total bans against embryological
procedures are unconstitutional based on the First Amendment's freedom of speech and the Fourteenth
Amendment's right to privacy, and noting that many of the state laws are unconstitutionally vague).
15. See infra notes 136-93 and accompanying text (describing the six procedures discussed in this
Comment-cryopreservation, preimplantation screening, gene therapy, cell line development, twinning, and
basic research). This Comment defines "embryological research" narrowly as research on eggs fertilized
outside the uterus, prior to the appearance of the primitive streak.
16. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICIONARY 1801 (Philip B. Drove ed., 1980)
[hereinafter WEBSTER'S] (defining the "primitive streak" as an opaque band which appears in a newly fertilized
egg in the axial line of the embryo which represents the beginning of neural development for the embryo-the
beginning of the embryo's ability to sense even primitive sensations such as pain).
17. This limitation is based on the recommendations of the NIH's Human Embryo Research Panel. See
infra notes 60-70 and accompanying text. This Comment does not discuss research using fetal tissue, which
is defined by federal law as human tissue made available by way of a still birth or an abortion, or embryos
which resulted from fertilization within the womb.
18. Robertson, supra note 8. at 969-70.
19. Id. Robertson also tentatively argues that the time frame can be extended to twenty to twenty-five
days since the appearance of the embryonic streak is many days from the beginning formation of the brain and
the capacity to experience feelings. Id. See generally NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at 45-51 (discussing time
limitation alternatives for embryological research and the factors which lead to the conclusion that the
appearance of the primitive streak should be the definitive point).
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The arguments which define the rights of a fetus in the abortion context will
influence this discussion.20 While these issues have been explored as they relate
to other procedures, like fetal tissue research and organ donations, embryological
research raises unique questions requiring independent analysis due to physio-
logical and locational differences.2' Such differences include the location of the
unimplanted embryo outside of the mother, the lack of cell differentiation in an
embryo, and the development of the neural system in the fetus.2 Section I will
briefly discuss how embryos become available for research and the recent
legislative history surrounding federal funding of embryological research,
including the proposed guidelines for receipt of such funding.2 Section II will
identify and analyze state laws that restrict embryological research? 4 Finally,
Section III will analyze the constitutionality of such restrictions based on the right
to privacy as it relates to embryological research and the freedom of speech as it
relates to the right to gather knowledge through research. 5
I. BACKGROUND
A. Embryo Creation
In vitro fertilization provides a means to produce embryos in addition to those
actually necessary to fertilize a woman. 26 In vitro fertilization is utilized through-
out the world as a method of treating infertility.27 The process begins by
20. See infra notes 229-69,290-342 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the abortion cases
on the constitutionality of state laws which completely prohibit various procedures which use human embryos).
21. Robertson, supra note 8, at 971.
22. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the appearance of the
primitive streak).
23. See infra notes 26-117 and accompanying text.
24. See infra notes 118-93 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 194-462 and accompanying text.
26. Dickey, supra note 1, at 332; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 33-34. The scope of this Comment is
limited to discussing embryos which are available for research, but which are not produced solely for research
purposes. While this Comment will briefly touch on the ethical issues surrounding embryological research, a
full discussion would necessarily include embryos produced solely for research. See generally NIH REPORT,
supra note 1, at 53-63 (discussing ethical issues surrounding the source of embryos for research and presenting
the conclusions of the Human Embryo Research Panel); Robertson, supra note 8, at 984-85 (noting the
arguments for and against producing embryos solely for research); Mark W. Danis, Note, Fetal Tissue
Transplants: Restricting Recipient Designation, 39 HASTINGS U. 1079 (1988) (arguing for the enactment of
anonymous donation laws as a means of decreasing procreation for donation purposes, because the creation
of life for such purposes degrades women and the reproductive process).
27. Fletcher & Ryan, supra note 5, at 132; see Helen Bequaert Holmes, And in the Netherlands,
Guidelines for IVF, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 6, 6 (Aug. 1985) (discussing guidelines for in vitro fertilization
in the Netherlands); Peter Singer, Making Laws on Making Babies, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 4,5 (Aug. 1985)
(noting the history of Australian in vitro fertilization regulation); Steinbock, supra note 2, at 27 (quoting 1988
statistics that show thousands of babies have been born worldwide through in vitro fertilization and its
variations). For a more detailed description of the in vitro fertilization process, see generally HUMAN IN VITRO
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stimulating a woman's ovaries to increase egg production.28 One of two removal
procedures is then used to surgically aspirate29 the ovarian follicles30 and remove
seven or more eggs from the ovary.3' The removal of excess eggs reduces the risk
of harm to the mother brought about by the hormonal therapy and the removal
procedure if repeat implantation is necessary or desired. 2 After the eggs have
matured for approximately six hours, the eggs are combined with sperm and
incubated for approximately twelve hours in a blood serum with sustaining
nutrients.33 The woman, who has been given hormones that prepare her uterus for
the embryo, is then implanted with two to four of the fertilized eggs; the size of
each egg now ranges from two to eight cells.34 The remaining eggs are typically
FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO TRANSFER (D. Wolf& M. Quigley eds., 1984) [hereinafter Wolf& Quigley].
28. Schaefer, supra note 2, at 90; see id. (describing a process called superovulation, which increases
the number of eggs surgically retrieved as well as the number of eggs which can be implanted into the mother);
see also Dickey, supra note 1, at 323-24 (identifying the drugs used as clomiphene citrate and human
menopausal gonadotropin); Robertson, supra note 8, at 948 (1986) (explaining that one drug is given to
stimulate ova production and another is given to assure maturation).
29. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 16, at 130 (defining "aspirate" as a procedure which uses suction to
remove the eggs).
30. See HENRY GRAY, ANATOMY OFTHE HUMAN BODY 1568-69 (Carmine D. Clemente ed,. 30th ed.
1985) (describing "ovarian follicle" as a small sac which contains eggs as they mature).
31. Jean M. Eggen, The "Orwellian Nightmare" Reconsidered: A Proposed Regulatory Framework
for the Advanced Reproductive Technologies, 25 GA. L. REv. 625, 633-34 (1991); Lagod & Martin, supra note
8, at 265; Schaefer, supra note 2, at 90; see Eugene B. Brody, Reproduction Without Sex-But with the Doctor,
15 LAw, MED. & HEALTH CARE 152, 153 (1987) (noting that egg removal is done by puncturing the ovarian
follicles); Robertson, supra note 8, at 977 (explaining that many in vitro fertilization programs will not fertilize
the excess eggs or will not remove more eggs than required for a single implantation in order to bypass the
controversy of discarding embryos). See generally Joseph Saltarelli, Note, Genesis Retold: Legal Issues Raised
by the Cryopreservation of Preimplantation Human Embryos, 36 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1021, 1026-29 (1985)
(describing the in vitro fertilization process in more detail).
32. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 33-34; see id. (discussing various risks involved with the hormone
therapy, the retrieval process, and the implantation procedure); Dickey, supra note 1, at 332 (citing multiple
instances where excess egg retrieval was a necessity); supra note 2 (providing information regarding expense
and rate of conception).
33. Wolf & Quigley, supra note 27, at 287-89; Schaefer, supra note 2, at 90; see Van Blerkom, supra
note 7, at 9-11 (discussing the medium in which the embryo is cultured).
34. Robertson, supra note 8, at968; Schaefer, supra note 2, at 90-91; see Dickey, supra note 1, at 326
(identifying the hormones used to prepare the uterus for the embryo as progesterone hormones); Vicki G.
Norton, Comment, Unnatural Selection: Nontherapeutic Preimplantation Genetic Screening and Proposed
Regulation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1581, 1594-96 (1994). Multiple egg implantation raises the probability of
success. Saltarelli, supra note 31, at 1027 n.32; see id. (citing one study which found the probability increased
from 13% in single implantation procedures to 31% in multiple implantation procedures); cf. id. (citing other
studies which indicate that supra ovulation leads to a higher rate of chromosomal abnormalities in the
embryos). Additionally, multiple implantation raises the probability of multiple pregnancies leading to risks
of complications during pregnancy, cesarean procedures, premature births and higher neonatal mortality rate.
Robertson, supra, at 977 n.127; see Lyons, Father Says Multiple Births Were Not Aim of Treatment, N.Y.
TIMES, May 24, 1985, at A12 (illustrating these risks through the birth of septuplets in California). But see Van
Blerkom, supra note 7, at I 1 (suggesting that the hormones used to hyperstimulate egg production may also
inhibit the uterine from accepting a transferred embryo).
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frozen by cryopreservation35 in case the first implantation does not result in a live
birth or future pregnancies are desired.36 The fertilized eggs may remain frozen
for two to three years without degradation.37 This results in the production of
excess eggs that can be used for research, although they are also frequently trans-
ferred to other women.38
B. Legislative History
Since 1980, researchers have essentially been banned from receiving federal
funding for embryological research. 9 In 1980, a law was passed that allowed
federal funding of embryological research projects after a favorable review by a
Department of Health and Human Services Ethical Advisory Board regarding the
ethical issues for a specific scientific project.40 The only board appointed con-
cluded that in vitro fertilization research was ethically acceptable in the abstract
provided certain guidelines were followed.4' However, since no action was taken
by the National Institutes of Health (NIH) on a specific project subsequent to that
approval and no other boards were ever appointed, the NIH never funded any
research involving embryos.42 In 1993, Congress nullified the regulation so that
embryo research could receive funding unless an ethical advisory committee
made findings contrary to such a grant.
43
35. See NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at D-4 (defining "cryopreservation" as a method of storage through
freezing); infra notes 136-38 and accompanying text (describing the cryopreservation process).
36. Jennifer P. Brown, Comment, "Unwanted, Anonymous, Biological Descendants": Mandatory
Donation Laws and Laws Prohibiting Preembryo Discard Violate the Constitutional Right to Privacy, 28
U.S.F. L. REV. 183, 188 (1993).
37. Id. at 189; see id. (noting successful births have been achieved when the embryo was implanted
after being cryopreserved for 38 months, although the success rate for live births is less than 10%); see also
Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W. 2d 588, 598 (Tenn. 1992) (noting that expert testimony estimated that the viability
of cryopreserved embryos was limited to two years but that law review articles have reported various time
limits from two years to ten years).
38. Perkins, supra note 2, at Al; see id. (explaining that donating eggs is on the rise as more women
postpone childbearing until an age when they produce fewer eggs, thus decreasing the odds of pregnancy), See
generally Margaret J. Radin, What, If Anything, Is Wrong with Baby Selling, 26 PAc. L.J. 135 (1995). This
Comment does not address embryo donation and issues which may be implicated.
39. NIH GUDELINEs, supra note 7, at 1.
40. Health and Human Services Policy for Protection of Human Subjects Research, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,276
(1994) (deleting 46 C.F.R. § 46.204(d)); NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1.
41. NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1.
42. Id.
43. Health and Human Services Policy for Protection of Human Subjects Research, 59 Fed. Reg. 28,276
(1994); see id. (noting that the National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Public Law No. 103.43,
§ 121(c) nullified the requirement for an ethical review board as mandated by 46 CFR 46.204(d)). The House
Report regarding this act clarified that Congress believed this area of research to be promising, especially in
the treatment of infertility, and stated that the previous regulation hobbled embryological research and left the
private sector to perform embryological research without clear ethical and medical standards. H. REP. No. 103-
28, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 80 (1993) (cited in NAT'L INS. OF HEALTH, Executive Summary to REPORT OF THE
HUMAN EMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL 1-2 (1994) [hereinafter Executive Summary]); see H. Rep. No. 103-28,
1338
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Prior to allocating funds to research involving embryos, the NIH established
the Human Embryo Research Panel to consider the moral and ethical issues raised
by such research, and to develop guidelines for reviewing funding requests and
for conducting such projects 4 The panel was composed of nineteen individuals
from various backgrounds, contributing expertise in the fields of basic and
clinical research, ethics, law, social science, public health, and public policy 5
This panel met six times and produced a report for the Advisory Committee
to the Director of the NIH.M The meetings were open to the public and the NIH
solicited public comment regarding research on embryos.47 On September 26,
1994, the panel advocated proceeding with embryological research and presented
proposed guidelines.48 These recommendations were formally accepted by the
Advisory Committee to Dr. Harold Varmus, 49 the NIH Director, on December 1-
2, 1994.50 Then, on December 2, 1994, President Clinton clarified an earlier
endorsement of embryological research by directing the NIH to forego funding
on research projects that involved creating embryos solely for the purpose of
research.51 The approval of federal embryological research funding has since been
put on hold because Congress prohibited the NIH from using federal funding for
embryological research as part of the budget compromise in 1996.
52
104th Cong. Ist Sess. 80 (1993) (reflecting the congressional intent underlying the enactment of the National
Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993, Public Law 103-43 § 121(c) which nullified 46 CFR 46.204(d),
a provision requiring an ethical advisory board review of in vitro fertilization research proposals prior to
funding).
44. NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 1.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 2.
47. Ld. at 2-3; see id. (stating that the NIH mailed solicitations to over 200 organizations and collected
over 55,000 written opinions).
48. Id.
49. Dr. Varmus received a Nobel Prize in medicine in 1989 for his cancer research at the University
of California, San Francisco. RTC Nominee Tate Withdraws; Other Administration News, FACrS ON FILE
WORLD NEWS DIGEST, Dec. 9, 1993, at 911 G2; The MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (Educational Broadcasting
& GWETA television broadcast, Nov. 30, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
50. NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3.
51. Press Release by President Bill Clinton (Dec. 2, 1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal);
NIH GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 3.
52. Act of Jan. 26, 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-99, 110 Stat. 26 § 128; see id. (preventing the use of any
funds made available by Public Law 104-91 for the creation of human research embryos or embryo research
in which the embryo is destroyed, discarded or knowingly subjected to risk of injury or death greater than an
embryo would naturally be subjected); Charles Krauthammer, Petty Measures Aren't Victoriesfor Republicans,
DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 10, 1996, at 3 IA (noting that budget negotiations, which included no funding
for embryological research, resulted in a consensus which kept the government operational until March 15,
1996).
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C. Proposed Guidelines
The guidelines proposed by the Human Embryo Research Panel tried to detail
acceptable policies based on generally held public views-including when life
begins-which could be used to determine the proper guidelines for accepting
and denying embryological research funding requests.53 After gathering a multi-
tude of public opinion and scientific data, the panel found that embryological
research should be permitted based on three primary considerations.54 First, they
found that there is a great likelihood of benefit from embryological research,
particularly in the areas of infertility, genetic defects, and therapeutic procedures
for diseases.55 Second, while recognizing that an embryo has a status deserving
of some respect, they found that its status is not equivalent to that of a child,
because of the lack of developmental individualism and sentience, 56 as well as the
extremely high natural mortality rate of an embryo.57 Lastly, they concluded that
without federal funding, embryological research will continue in the private
sector and throughout the world. 8 However, the panel believed that this private
research would continue to lack the consistent ethical and scientific review that
accompanies federally funded research5 9
After weighing the necessity of research using preimplantation embryos
against the moral status of the embryo, the panel concluded that embryological
research is permissible, as it is critical to the field of reproductive medicine and
the health needs of women, men, and children. 60 Specific guidelines included the
use of standard scientific methods and qualified researchers, informed consent
from male and female donors, and independent review of protocols and consent
53. Executive Summary, supra note 43, at ix.
54. Id. at x.
55. Id.
56. See NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at D-8 (describing "sentience" as the ability to sense or feel things,
especially pain).
57. Executive Summary, supra note 43, at x; see Robertson, supra note 8, at 968-70 (stating that the
embryo is not able to experience pain, is not sentient, and has no brain activity until the primitive streak,
embryonic disc, and axis appear and that an embryo is not individualized because twinning could still occur).
But see Tamara L. Davis, Comment, Protecting the Cryopreserved Embryo, 57 TENN. L. REV. 507, 529-30
(1990) (discussing Dr. Jerome Lejeune's alternate theory that the embryo, at the moment of conception, is
individualistic because the embryo has a unique set of genetic instructions to produce a unique person).
58. Executive Summary, supra note 43, at x.
59. Id.; see Robertson, supra note 8, at 1035 (arguing that lack of national guidelines leaves in vitro
fertilization patients open to the risk of incompetent services); see also Fletcher & Ryan, supra note 5, at 130-
32 (suggesting that current research involving fetal tissue, including embryological research, which is being
performed outside the scope of minimal federal regulations and guidelines, is detrimental to the fetus and the
mother). But see Dickey, supra note 1, at 328-30 (noting that the American College of Obstetrics and
Gynecology and the American Fertility Society has guidelines regarding facilities and personnel requirements
for providing optimum in vitro fertilization results). Examples of detriments include lack of efficacy and
relatively low success rates with in vitro fertilization and inability to inform the parents regarding risks
associated with fetal diagnosis and alternative approaches to infertility. Fletcher & Ryan, supra, at 130-32.
60. Executive Summary, supra note 43, at xi-xii.
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forms.61 Additionally, the NIH panel dictated that embryos be used minimally,
supporting only those projects that cannot be accomplished in some other way
and in which prior animal studies have been performed if applicable.62 Further-
more, selection of embryos must be fairly distributed throughout population
groups.63 Research on embryos is to be limited to the time prior to the appearance
of the primitive streak.64 Compensation will be limited to that which is reasonably
in accord'with general compensation practices for experimental protocols.
65
Clearly, the panel gave much thought to ethical concerns regarding the sale of
embryos for profit, lack of respect for life due to the indiscriminate use of
embryos when the research could be conducted in another manner, equitable
selection of embryos, and consent issues.6 Furthermore, the panel was uncom-
fortable with transferring research embryos to a uterus if the resulting newborn
would suffer harm as a result of the research. 67 Lastly, the panel found that
research using parthenotes6s was acceptable with one caveat, even though this
type of research is not possible at this time.69 According to the NIH panel, the
parthenote, an egg which can be activated to begin cleavage and development
without fertilization, must not be transferred to a uterus, so as to prevent an egg
from developing into a fetus without a paternal progenitor.7
The panel provided examples of embryological research projects. Based on
the panel's ethical concerns and the merits of the various research projects, these
examples were ranked as acceptable for federal funding, requiring more review
61. NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at 65-67, 74-76.
62. Id. at 64-67. Prior animal studies may not be applicable if the research related to an aspect of
humans which was not physiologically comparable to another animal.
63. Id. at 67.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 67. See generally id. at 54-55 (examining the embryological research and commercialization);
Joel N. Ephross, Technote, In Vitro Fertilization: Perspectives on Current Issues, 32 JuRIMErRICS J. 447, 461-
62 (1992) (discussing the concerns regarding commercialization of a reproductive technology).
66. NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at 53-56, 66.
67. Id. at 40-41.
68. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 16, at 1646 (defining "parthenote" as an individual created without
fertilization); Executive Summary, supra note 43, at xv (establishing that "parthenotes" are oocytes, or eggs,
which have been activated to begin cleavage and development without fertilization). These cells rarely reach
the implantation stage of in vitro fertilization and the few which do reach that stage fail shortly thereafter due
to the lack of fertilization. Id. Because of the lack of viability, parthenotes do not represent a form of asexual
reproduction. Id.
69. NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at 61-62,70-71; see Executive Summary, supra note 43, at xv (noting
that the development of a fetus from a parthenote was an impossibility because of the mortality rate).
70. NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at 61-62, 70-71; see Executive Summary, supra note 43, at xv
(recognizing that concerns over the lack of a paternal progenitor are baseless because of the mortality rate).
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prior to funding, or unacceptable for federal funding.7' Many other countries and
commentators have suggested similar guidelines
2
D. Ethical Considerations
As the Human Embryo Research Panel discovered, ethical considerations
play a role in determining the proper role embryo usage should have in science
and reproduction. The major ethical dilemma-the moral status of the embryo-
is presented in the age-old question asked by scholars and philosophers-when
does life begin?73 Three views exist regarding the moral and legal status of an
embryo.74 The first viewpoint is that the fertilization of an egg creates an obli-
gation to provide that newly created embryo with an opportunity for life.!5 This
theory is based upon the belief that the embryo is a new "genotype ''76 and that the
71. Examples of studies which would be acceptable for federal funding, provided the guidelines are
followed, include the following: (1) Studies aimed at increasing the probability of a successful pregnancy; (2)
experiments related to the fertilization process, oocyte activation, the relative role of paternal and maternal
genetic material, egg maturation, freezing prior to fertilization, and development of embryonic stem cells; and
(3) research projects designed to perfect preimplantation genetic diagnosis and nuclear transplantation without
transfer to a uterus. NIH REPORT, supra note 1, at 75-77. Examples of research which would be particularly
sensitive and would require further review prior to federal funding includes research after the appearance of
the primitive streak and prior to the neural tube closure, cloning without transfer to a uterus, and nuclear
transplantation which is then transferred to a uterus. Id. at 77-80. These studies would be reviewed if they
showed extraordinary scientific or therapeutic merit. Id. at 77. Projects which the panel found unacceptable
for federal funding include the following: (1) Cloning resulting in the implantation of the embryo into a uterus,
(2) using of embryos beyond the closure of the neural tube, (3) preimplantation genetic diagnosing solely for
sex selection without regard for sex-linked genetic diseases, (4) cross-species fertilization when not done for
the sole purpose of testing the ability of sperm to penetrate eggs, (5) parthenogenesis experimentation which
results in the transferring of a parthenote to a womb, and (6) research which would result in a human embryo
being implanted in another species or outside a human uterus. Id. at 80-83.
72. Gregoratos, supra note 8, at 997-1006; see id. at 997-99 (citing Australia's guidelines for research
using spare embryos); id. at 999-1000 (noting the United Kingdom's recommendations for embryological
research); id. at 1001-06 (proposing guidelines for regulating embryological research, including not creating
embryos solely for research, consent requirements, limiting research to the 14 day window prior to the
appearance of the primitive streak, and prohibiting research which involves subsequent embryo transfer),
73. See generally Daniel Wikler, Concepts of Personhood: A Philosophical Perspective, in DEFINING
HUMAN LIFE: MEDICAL, LEGAL, AND ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS 12, 12-23 (Margery W. Shaw & A. Edward
Doudera eds., 1983).
74. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 29-32. See generally Stephen C. Hicks, The Right to Life in Law: The
Embryo and Fetus, the Body and Soul, The Family and Society, 19 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 805 (1992).
75. Robertson, supra note 8, at 971; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 29-31. This view is held by anti-
abortion activists and the Catholic church. John A. Robertson, In the Beginning: The Legal Status of Early
Embryos, 76 VA. L. REV. 437,440 (1990). See Davis v. Davis, No., E-14496, 1989 Tenn, App. LEXIS 641,
*34-35 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) [hereinafter Davis 1] (holding that decisions regarding the disposition
of the embryos must take the best interests of the embryos, as children, into consideration); Brown, supra note
36, at 222 (noting that the Davis I trial court is the only court which has recognized this viewpoint).
76. See WEBSTER'S, supra note 16, at 947 (defining a "genotype" as the fundamental genetic
constitution of an organism).
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preembryo has the potential to become a "person." 77 According to this theory, this
potentiality should be afforded every protection that can be given to a living
person. On the opposite end of the spectrum is the theory that the embryo, prior
to viability, is equivalent to any other human tissue. This theory eliminates the
objectionability of embryological research as long as proper consent is given.!
This theory has been rejected by the Tennessee Supreme Court in Davis v.
Davis.7 9 Lastly, the most neutral argument is that an embryo has less status than
a person, but should be afforded greater respect than other tissues due to the
potentiality of life.80 This theory represents the majority opinion, held by various
courts and a variety of ethical committees." The primitive streak limitation
suggested by the Human Embryo Research Panel acknowledges the respect for
life that should be afforded an embryo by permitting research only prior to the
appearance of the primitive streak: the point before which the embryo does not
experience pain and has no brain activity.82
While the moral status of embryos continues to trouble society, the courts
have remained steadfast in their interpretations of an embryo's legal status.
Except for laws restricting abortions, the law has almost never recognized the
legal status of a non-viable fetus or embryo prior to birth.83 The Supreme Court
77. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 29-31; Brown, supra note 36, at 193-94 (citing the Ethics Committee
of the American Fertility Society's Ethical Considerations of the New Reproductive Technologies, 53
FERTILrrY & STERILITY IS, 17S (Supp. 2 1990)).
78. Robertson, supra note 8. at 972. The American Fertility Society advocates this position. Brown,
supra note 36, at 194 n.90.
79. Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 596-97 (Tenn. 1992) [hereinafter Davis I1], cert. denied sub nom.
Stowe v. Davis, 507 U.S. 911 (1993); see id. (discussing the three theories of the moral and legal status of an
embryo and rejecting the two extreme theories). But see York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421, 424-25 (E.D. Va.
1989) (assuming that the subject matter of a dispute between a fertility clinic and a couple who wished to
transfer their preembryo to another clinic was "property").
80. Robertson, supra note 8, at 972; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 31-32. See generally Lisa S. Cahill,
In Vitro Fertilization: Ethical Issues in Judaeo-Christian Perspective, 32 LoY. L. REV. 337, 340-54 (1986)
(discussing different religious views regarding the moral status of the conceptus and reaching the conclusion
that embryological research with excess embryos from the in vitro fertilization process is morally sound due
to the decreased status of the embryo).
81. The various commissions include the United States Ethics Advisory Board, the Warnock Committee
in Great Britain, the Waller Committee in Australia and the Ontario Law Reform Commission in Canada.
Brown, supra note 36, at 197-98; see also Hecht v. Superior Court (Kane), 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 850,20 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (1993) (holding that a man has sufficient property rights over his sperm in the nature of
decision-making authority to determine the use of his sperm after his death); Davis II, 842 S.W.2d at 596-97
(holding that a preembryo deserves special respect, greater than body organs, but not as great as a "person").
82. Robertson, supra note 8, at 984.
83. See, e.g., Bums v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (holding that the state does not need to make Aid
to Families of Dependent Children payments for an unborn child); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C.
1946) (permitting, for the first time, a tort claim to be brought on behalf of a viable fetus). Keeler v. Superior
Court of Amador County, 2 Cal. 3d 619, 633-34,470 P.2d 617, 626, 87 Cal. Rptr. 481,490 (1970) (declining
to find a man guilty of murder when he beat a pregnant woman to such an extent that the fetus was stillborn
with a cracked skull and cerebral hemorrhaging); Reyes v. Superior Court In & For San Bemadino County,
75 Cal. App. 3d 214, 216, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (1977) (acquitting a mother of criminal child endangerment
when she used heroin throughout pregnancy and failed to seek prenatal care despite warning of fetal
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affirmed the lesser legal status of a nonviable fetus or embryo by holding that its
status is not equivalent to a viable fetus or person.m4 The courts have used the
point of viability85 to delineate when state interests override the mother's interest
and this line of demarcation can easily be used to classify embryos.
8 6
While the central ethical issue in embryological research is the moral status
of the embryo, other related issues are troubling as well. For instance, the
exploitive sale of embryos is a concern-one that is also recognized by the
Human Embryo Research Panel8 -- and an argument can be made that their sale
is analogous to the sale of human beings.88 Thus, it has been argued that sancti-
fying embryo compensation would be tantamount to sanctifying slavery, and
would devalue society's respect for human life. 9 However, society's respect for
human life is not devalued if the bigger picture of promoting health and pro-
creation through reproductive technologies is kept in view. 9°
endangerment, which resulted in the birth of twins addicted to heroin); People v. Chavez, 77 Cal. App. 2d 621,
626-27, 176 P.2d 92, 94-95 (1947) (holding that legal status is afforded a fetus which has been born alive and
exists separately from the mother). But see People v. Carlson, 37 Cal. App. 3d 349, 355-56, 112 Cal. Rptr, 321,
324-25 (1974) (noting that the legislature revised the definition of manslaughter to include the killing of a
viable fetus, while leaving the definition of murder as the killing of a human being unchanged); Del Zio v.
Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74 Civ. 3588 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (LEXIS, Ny Library, Nymega File),
reprinted in 2 BIOETHICD REP. 7, 14-15 (1985) (awarding a couple $5000 damages for intentional infliction of
emotional distress when a physician, who objected to the couple's efforts at in vitro fertilization, destroyed the
couple's preembryo). See generally Lori B. Andrews, The Legal Status of the Embryo, 32 LOY. L. REV. 357,
362-95 (1989) [hereinafter Legal Status] (taking a historical look at the legal status of the fetus); Gregoratos,
supra note 8, at 988 (discussing the property rights afforded the unborn, but noting that live birth is a condition
precedent to enforcement of those rights in most cases).
84. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 860 (1992) (stating that the state does have an interest in the fetus prior to viability, though it does
not outweigh the mother's interest such that abortions may be prohibited); York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421,
425 (E.D.Va. 1989) (stating that the embryos of a couple should be treated as property, such that if the couple
were to divorce, embryo disposition would be negotiated as part of a property settlement); Davis 11, 842
S.W.2d at 595-97 (rejecting the lower court's opinion that embryos should be treated as a person by holding
that the embryos had less status than a person, but greater significance than bodily organs). But see infra notes
364-81 and accompanying text (discussing court decisions which infringed upon this right by allowing state
regulation of certain aspects, like funding and consent). See generally Legal Status, supra note 83 (analyzing
the legal status of the embryo); Schaefer, supra note 2, at 92-98 (examining the legal and moral status of an
embryo).
85. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 163 (defining "viability" as the point at which a fetus is capable of meaningful
life outside of the mother's womb).
86. Robertson, supra note 8, at 973-74; see id. (noting that even philosophers who believe abortion is
morally wrong usually do not grant an embryo the same status and right to life as they would grant a viable
fetus or person unless there is some nervous system development and implantation has occurred).
87. See supra note 65 and accompanying text (indicating that the panel proposed restrictions on the
compensation received for embryos used in medical and scientific procedures).
88. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1020.
89. Id. at 1020-23.
90. Id.; cf. Danis, supra note 26, at 1091-92 (discussing the degradation of the reproductive process by
creating life for use by a designated organ recipient).
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Based on society's broad recognition and respect of the embryo as a symbol
of life, further ethical issues arise beyond the debate over where life begins, such
as issues involving the disposal of the dead, interference with the natural order,
and eugenics.9 Disposing of excess embryos could be troubling to some because
of the reverence of sacred rituals for the disposal of the dead.92 These rituals are
intertwined with personal beliefs and are often religious in nature.93 These per-
sonal beliefs are derived from a respect of the dead and a need to maintain a
connection to past generations. 94 However, the donation of spare, "dead" embryos
for research is a personal, private decision by the gamete providers akin to those
surrounding the funeral ritual. Additionally, the decision to donate is identical to
a next-of-kin's decision to donate the deceased's body for medical research-a
charitable act which is applauded in our culture. This personal decision regarding
the method of a dead embryo's disposal should be given the same respect as the
personal decision of another to participate in a different funeral ritual. In light of
the personal nature of these convictions, the personal and private decision by the
gamete providers to donate spare, "dead" embryos should not offend society's
ethical concerns, thus permitting the gamete providers the privacy to observe their
own rituals.
Additionally, embryological research could be viewed as undermining human
dignity by objectifying and manipulating the intimacies of procreation, which
interrupts the natural order.95 This argument criticizes genetic research as leading
to the view of children as mere commodities-an especially odious view in a
world where many children await adoption and numerous countries suffer from
overpopulation.96 Such a devaluation of human dignity paves the road for more
nefarious uses, such as those portrayed in Aldous Huxley's Brave New World.
97
Huxley portrayed a world which had lost all respect for life and dignity, pro-
ducing humans with characteristics appropriate for their stations in life and who
lived their lives in a drug-induced haze. Many fear that embryological research
is the first step toward that world where personal freedom is a subconscious
dream that never breaks through the drug-induced fog.
91. See SLOANE SUPP., supra note 7, at 229 (defining "eugenics" as the study of controlling procreation
to eliminate undesirable traits by discouraging or prohibiting reproduction between certain individuals, called
negative eugenics, or promoting desirable traits by encouraging reproduction between certain individuals,
called positive eugenics).
92. Joel Feinberg, The Mistreatment of Dead Bodies, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 31, 32-33 (1985);
Leon R. Kass, Thinking About the Body, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 20,29-30 (1985); see id. (discussing the
importance of funeral rituals to various cultures).
93. Kass, supra note 92, at 29-30.
94. Id.
95. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1024.
96. Id. at 1025; see id. (noting that surrogate mothers are being paid to produce the "right" children
when there are many children throughout the world who could be adopted).
97. ALDOUS HUXLEY, BRAVE NEW WORLD (1946); see id. (describing a world where state hatcheries
create babies with predetermined characteristics appropriate for their predetermined social position).
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While concerns regarding the improper use of technology may be justified,
preserving the natural order by using technology to aid natural processes, such as
reproduction, should not exclude the possibility of embryological research. The
natural order is disrupted daily in the medical arena by combating disease and
death.98 Merely examining the field of obstetrics yields evidence of advancements
in medicine that could be disruptive to the natural order.99 If procreation may be
facilitated through drugs or organ reconstruction, then embryological research,
which facilitates procreation and increases longevity, becomes indistin-
guishable. 1°° However, while the medical profession constantly disrupts the
natural order through various medical procedures, there are examples where
medical practices have possibly had negative consequences. For instance, the
prolonging of life may have social, political, and psychological consequences
which negatively affect society in its present form.'0 ' Even in today's society,
increased longevity has raised questions of how to adequately care for the elderly,
and how to economically support a large, growing retired population, as well as
ethical issues regarding assisted suicide.
Other ethical issues include genetic concerns, such as the increasing risk of
producing abnormal children due to genetic manipulation at the embryonic stage,
the dilemma regarding the disposition of spare embryos, the process of cloning,
the use of preimplantation genetic testing in the decision to terminate a preg-
nancy, the implantation of non-parental genetic material, the possibility of genetic
engineering to enhance beneficial characteristics, and the creation of life solely
for research.' °2 Genetic research is suspect among many who fear the unknown
effects of newly acquired knowledge. 0 3 Such newly acquired knowledge can
fundamentally change the moral and ethical beliefs held by a society. 104 However,
fears based on these changes, such as the fear of genetic engineering and technical
control of humans as portrayed in Huxley's Brave New World, should be lessened
by realizing that embryological research is merely one element of this picture and
98. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1024.
99. Id. at 1024 n.294; see id. (noting that labor induction and postponement drugs, infertility workups
requiring stimulated cycles, and microsurgical tubal reconstruction are examples of medicine objectifying the
human body).
100. Id. at 1024.
101. James R. Ferguson, Scientific Inquiry and The First Amendment, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 639, 643
(1979).
102. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 32-44; see Norton, supra note 34, at 1583-87 (noting concerns over
eugenics when preimplantation genetic screening is used for nontherapeutic purposes). See generally Gore &
Owens, supra note 4, at 353-55 (describing concerns regarding genetic research); Joseph Fletcher, Ethics and
Recombinant DNA Research, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1131 (1978) (discussing the ethical implications of research
which results in changing bacteria).
103. See generally PHILIP KITCHER, THE LivEs TO COME: THE GENErIC REVOLUTION AND HUMAN
Possmmrrms (1996) (describing the major ethical and social concerns surrounding genetic technology).
104. Ferguson, supra note 101, at 641; see id. (citing examples of such alterations in societal concepts,
such as the works of Copernicus, Galileo, and Darwin).
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would not necessarily lead to the world foretold in Huxley's fictional prophecy.,05
The small steps taken through embryological research do not inherently lead to
the apocalyptic steps necessary to travel down the slippery slope towards con-
trolling the "wisdom of evolution."' ' Governmental control was a major factor
in the "brave new world" created by Huxley. In fact, governmental control over
a parent's right to dispose of her own genetic material is more analogous to
governmental eugenic decisions and represents a more likely step down that
slippery slope.'07
Additionally, consent to donation becomes an issue since informed consent
is impossible to receive from the embryo.'0 8 However, Richard A. McCormick,
a prolific writer in the field of ethics, 9 has argued that this issue may be resolved
through the concept of "proxy" consent." 0 According to McCormick, humans
generally desire to save other human lives only when there is no known risk and
105. Harlyn 0. Halvorson, DNA and the Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1167, 1168-71 (1978); Robertson,
supra note 8, at 1023; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 43; see Davis, supra note 57, at 533-34 (proposing that
commercialization, in addition to permitting embryological research, would lead to embryo banks filled with
embryos created solely for the purpose of "harvesting"); Halvorson, supra, at 1168-71 (noting factors which
can lead to disastrous results from research, including misuse of research results, overstatement of the results
or not fully informing the public of the results).
106. Robertson, supra note 8, at 1026 n.299 (citing the PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF
ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, SPLICING LIFE 62-64 (1982));
Steinbock, supra note 2, at 43; see Douglas A. Levy, Experts Callfor Genetic Privacy Legislation, U.P.I., Oct.
18, 1991 available in LEXIS, News Library, Arcnws File (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (quoting
Dr. Bernadine Healy, who was Director of the NIH at that time, as stating that "[like fire[,] ... all powerful
tools can be dangerous if misused or abused, and biomedicine's new molecular tools are no exception"). See
generally Carl Cohen, Restriction of Research with Recombinant DNA: The Dangers of Inquiry and the Burden
of Proof, 51 S. CAL. L. REV. 1081 (1978) (discussing various arguments concerning the fear of DNA research);
Ephross, supra note 65, at 463-65.
107. Lisa Hemphill, American Abortion Law Applied to New Reproductive Technology, 32 JURIMETRICS
J. 361, 375 (1992); Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 287; see Davis v. Davis, No. 180, 1990 Tenn. App.
LEXIS 642 at *6 n.7 (1989) (quoting FREDERICK L. SCHUMAN, THE NAZI DICTATORSHIP 382 (2d ed. 1939))
(suggesting that the forcing of gamete providers to become parents against their will is analogous to the state
control of reproduction in Nazi Germany).
108. Fletcher & Ryan, supra note 5, at 127; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 29; see Fletcher & Ryan, supra,
at 127 (arguing that fetal research is analogous to research using condemned prisoners which involves coercion,
cruelty and injury, except worse because prisoners deserve punishment).
109. Richard A. McCormick's writings were used by the National Commission for the Protection of
Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research when determining guideline recommendations in
1974. Fletcher & Ryan, supra note 5, at 128. Richard A. McCormick, has authored 14 books in the field of
ethics. David S. Toolan, Of Many Things; Richard McCormick Receives the Campion Award from the Catholic
Book Club, AMERICA, Dec. 2, 1995, at 2. McCormick is currently the John A. O'Brien Professor of Christian
Ethics at the University of Notre Dame. Id. He has also been the President of the Catholic Theological Society
of America and a Director of the American Society of Christian Ethics. Id. This Jesuit friar is the 1995 recipient
of the Campion Award due to his eminence as a scholar, writer and defender of the faith as presented by the
Catholic Book Club. Id.
110. Richard A. McCormick, Proxy Consent in the Experimentation Situation, in PERSPECTIVES IN
BIOLOGY AND MEDICINE 2-20 (1974).
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minimal discomfort."' Thus, if embryos will not be implanted, but merely dis-
carded, parents should be able to give consent by proxy to research when the
embryo itself would give consent to such research.'t 2 Because the risk is only to
an embryo that has no potential for life and that is being discarded without
suffering any discomfort (since the research was performed prior to the formation
of the primitive streak), the parents should always be able to give consent.13
This is consistent with the analysis necessary to establish substituted
judgment-a method of permissibly violating a person's right to bodily integrity
when that person is incapable or unable to consent. 114 Substituted judgment may
be permitted to violate a person's right to bodily integrity if the person, who is
unable to give consent, would have given the consent proposed by a family
member or professional." 5 Various factors are examined to determine the desire
of the incompetent patient, including the extent of the risk, the necessity of the
treatment or donation, and the benefit to the patient. 16 The donated, spare embryo
is not subjected to any additional risk since there is no opportunity for implan-
tation, and therefore no opportunity for life. The research projects for which an
embryo would be used would be absolutely necessary since the guidelines require
111. Id.; see Steinbock, supra note 2, at 29 (suggesting that if the embryo is not considered a human
subject, banning or failing to fund embryological research may be considered immoral due to the benefits
possible for the entire society).
112. McCormick, supra note 110, at 2-20.
113. Id. However, W. Walters, another writer which influenced the National Commission for the
Protection of Human Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research, argued that these decisions should not
consider the ultimate destination of the fetus, such as whether the fetus is aborted or discarded, contrary to
McCormick's view. Fletcher & Ryan, supra note 5, at 128.
114. Hart v. Brown, 289 A.2d 386, 391 (Conn. 1972); Little v. Little, 576 S.W.2d 493, 499-500 (Tex.
1979); Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 146-47 (Ky. 1969).
115. Cruzan by Cruzan v. Director, Mo. Dept. of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 285-87 (1990); see id.
(recognizing substituted judgment for an incompetent in order to disrupt the incompetent's bodily integrity to
aid a close family member, but noting that the State is not required to accept substituted judgment of close
family members absent clear and convincing evidence that the judgment reflects the patient's own views);
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 321 (1982) (defining the test for this lesser scrutiny as permissible if the
judgment reflects the exercise of proper professional judgment).
116. Little, 576 S.W.2d at 499-500; see id. (affirming the trial court's decision to permit a minor to
donate a kidney to a brother based on substituted judgment since the risk to the donor was minimal and there
appeared to be no coercion associated with the donor's consent, though the donor's wishes were admittedly
unknown due to the donor's mental condition); see also Hart, 289 A.2d at 391 (recognizing a parental right
to consent to the donation of a twin's kidney to the other twin, when combined with the consent of the guardian
ad litem, and when the risks were minimal, the donation was necessary, and the parent's motivation and
reasoning was favorably reviewed by a community representation); Strunk, 445 S.W.2d at 146-47 (affirming
the trial court's decision to remove an incompetent adult's kidney for transplant in an ailing brother based on
substituted judgment when it was in the best interest of the incompetent because of the close relationship
between the brothers and the minimal risk the operation posed); cf Curran v. Bosze, 566 N.E.2d 1319, 1343-44
(1Il. 1990) (distinguishing this case for compelling a bone marrow test for a possible match and transplant from
previous court decisions authorizing kidney transplants on the basis of the lack of a benefit to the donor twins,
who were born out of wedlock, since the twins lacked a close relationship to the donee, a half-brother from the
father's marriage). But see In re Guardianship of Pescinski, 226 N.W.2d 180, 181-82 (Wis. 1975) (declining
to adopt "substituted judgment" even though the donor and donee were siblings),
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other avenues to be explored first, such as computer simulation and animal
experimentation. Because of the overwhelming nature of the first two elements,
the beneficial aspect can be very tenuous. While there is no benefit to that
particular embryo, many research projects would benefit close relatives.
Additionally, altruism for the benefit of mankind should not be overlooked,
because people need to experience a connection with others, which can be
achieved through donations that benefit mankind.'17 Based on these factors, we
can rely on the substituted judgment of the gamete providers when they donate
spare, "dead" embryos for use in a research or reproductive procedure.
There are many ethical concerns as evidenced by this short discussion, and
the issues raised in this Comment have merely graze the surface. As noted
previously, mankind has struggled with these dilemmas throughout the ages and
will probably continue to struggle with them. However, some states have
grappled with these same issues and promulgated legislation to promote their
resolution.
II. STATE LAWS
While there are twenty-four states which regulate fetal tissue research, only
ten states prohibit or restrict embryological research. "8 There are varying degrees
117. See infra notes 279-80 and accompanying text (discussing the importance that gift-giving plays in
society).
118. Contrast ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302 (1993) (abolishing experimentation with a conceptus
from an induced abortion); ARK. CODEANN. §§ 20-17-801, 20-17-802 (Michie 1991) (limiting the use of fetal
tissue); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25956,25957 (West 1984) (regulating research using fetal tissue
which is obtained prior to or subsequent to an abortion); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6), (7) (West 1993)
(prohibiting research on live fetuses and describing appropriate methods for disposal of fetal remains); IND.
CODE ANN. § 16-34-2-6 (West Supp. 1995) (criminalizing experimentation on aborted fetuses); KY. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 436.026 (Baldwin 1993) (banning experimentation on live or viable aborted children); MO. ANN. STAT.
§ 188.037 (Vernon 1983) (banning experimentation and research on fetuses prior to and subsequent to an
abortion); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-108(3) (1991) (preventing research or experimentation on any
premature, live infant, except for therapeutic purposes); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-342, 28-346 (1989) (restricting
experimentation on aborted children); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.14 (Anderson 1993) (restricting experi-
mentation on aborted conceptus); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984) (prohibiting experimentation
on aborted children); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 34-23A-17 (1994) (prohibiting fetal transplantation
subsequent to an abortion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-208(a) (1991) (limiting experimentation or research on
aborted fetuses without the consent from the mother); and Wyo. STAT, § 35-6-115 (1994) (describing penalties
for giving away an aborted fetus for experimentation) with LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (West 1991)
(limiting the use of any product of conception); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992) (restricting
the use of a conceptus created through in vitro fertilization from the embryonic stage through the fetal stage);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Law. Co-op. 1996) (regulating the use of a live conceptus and procedures
which are not conducted to determine or preserve the life or health of the conceptus); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 333.2685-2692 (West 1992) (banning nontherapeutic embryological research, not to include diagnostic
procedures which determine health, if the procedure substantially jeopardizes the health of the embryo or if
the embryo is the subject of a planned abortion); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 145.421, 145.422 subd. 1, 2 (West
1992) (prohibiting research or experimentation on a conceptus when the research or experimentation is harmful
to the conceptus); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-b:15 (1994) (limiting the maintenance of a preembryo ex utero
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of regulation, from the most permissive, which permits research using human
embryos as long as the embryo is not subsequently transferred to a uterus, to
others which approach the use of embryos for research from the viewpoint of the
embryo or fetus by examining the level of risk to the embryo/fetus. t1 9
A. Legislative Intent
In order to determine the constitutionality of procedures that use embryos
particular attention must be paid to the state interests protected by the various
state laws which regulate embryological research. 20 For instance, Louisiana's
identified interest is in the protection of the life of the unborn child from the
moment of conception, to the maximum extent allowable under the
Constitution. 21 Some state regulation of embryological and fetal research grew
out of Supreme Court decisions regarding the right to privacy in making
reproductive decisions. 122 States were concerned that research involving fetuses
in a noncryopreserved state to under 15 days and prohibiting the transfer of a research embryo to a uterine
cavity); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1, 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5 (Michie 1994) (banning research using fetuses or
embryos unless the procedure is of no significant risk to the conceptus or minimally risky and benefits the
conceptus); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01, 14-02.2-02 (1991) (prohibiting fetal experimentation); 18 PA,
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Supp. 1995) (banning nontherapeutic experimentation and medical procedures on
any unborn child); and R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1 (1994) (limiting experimentation and research on embryos
and fetuses).
119. Lori B. Andrews, State Regulation of Embryo Research, in 2 PAPERS COMMISSIONED FOR THE
HUMANEMBRYO RESEARCH PANEL, NAT'L INST. OFHEALTH, 297,299 (1994) [hereinafter State Regulation];
see MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 1992) (prohibiting embryological research which substantially
endangers the health or life of the fetus); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 subd. 2 (West 1989) (permitting
research which is harmless to the embryo); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15(11) (1994) (allowing
embryological research as long as the embryo is not transferred to a uterus after the research); see also MASS.
ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(1) (Law. Co-op. 1996) (permitting diagnostic or remedial procedures which could
be characterized as research); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2685 (West 1992) (banning research which
utilizes embryos if the research is nontherapeutic); id. § 333.2686 (West 1992) (allowing diagnostic procedures
which would determine or improve the health of the embryo); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01(3) (1991)
(limiting regulation of embryological research by excluding diagnostic or remedial measures to determine or
preserve the health of the embryo); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Supp. 1995) (prohibiting embryo-
logical research which is not therapeutic to the embryo); id. § 3216(c) (Supp. 1995) (permitting in vitro
fertilization techniques which would be considered experimental, or research); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(b)
(1994) (excluding diagnostic and remedial measures designed to determine or preserve the embryo).
120. See infra notes 194-462 and accompanying text (proposing that the constitutionality of these laws
will hinge on the right to privacy as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment and the right to research as
incorporated in the First Amendment's guarantee of free speech).
121. LA. REV STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.35.0 (West 1992); Marilyn J. Clapp, Note, State Prohibition of Fetal
Experimentation and the Fundamental Right of Privacy, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1073, 1075 (1988).
122. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 297; Charles H. Baron, Fetal Research: The Question in the
States, 15 HASTIGS CENTER REP. 12, 12-13 (Apr. 1985); Eggen, supra note 31, at 668; Gary L. Reback, Fetal
Experimentation: Moral, Legal, and Medical Implications, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1191, 1191 n.2 (1974); Judith
W. Munson, Note, Fetal Research: A View from Right to Life to Wrongful Birth, 52 CtI.-KENTL. REV. 133.
133 (1975); Paula L. Lehmann, Comment, The Future of Fetal Research in California: A Proposalfor Change,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 859, 863-65 (1978); see State Regulation, supra, at 297 (proposing that Roe v. Wade
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or embryos would provide a social benefit for having an abortion, therefore
increasing the number of abortions.1 3 Thus, while the primary emphasis of state
legislation was to restrict the use of aborted fetuses, the language of some states
laws is broad enough to encompass prohibition of embryological research. 24 This
has resulted in a governmental failure to consider the unique issues raised by
advanced reproductive technologies.'5 However, some commentators have
suggested that procedures associated with in vitro fertilization would be excluded
from the prohibition, even if the specific language of the statute encompasses
such procedures, because the focus of the regulation was directed at reducing
abortions. 26
Another impetus for state regulation was the advent of in vitro fertilization
procedures, though this impact is less substantial. 27 States appear to be concerned
with fostering marriage and discouraging illegitimacy as related to in vitro
fertilization. 28 Some have argued that societal problems result when the insti-
tution of marriage and family are overlooked by giving birth to children outside
of marriage.' 29 Some of these concerns would include increased welfare and
poverty, as well as the degradation of society in general. Thus, the states may be
concerned that in vitro fertilization promotes childbirth outside of wedlock, when
childbirth outside of marriage is a common denominator in many of today's
societal problems, such as criminal tendencies, drug use and poverty.
influenced state embryological research bans); Norton, supra note 34, at 1610 (proposing that abortion
proponents support prohibition of embryological research due to a fear that ethically questionable embryo uses
may have a backlash effect on the right to make reproductive decisions).
123. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 297; Baron, supra note 122, at 12-13; Eggen, supra note 31,
at 668; Dennis M. Flannery et al., Test Tube Babies: Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization, 67 GEo. L.
J. 1295, 1299-1300 (1979); see, e.g., 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e) (1983 & Supp. 1995). Out of the 25
states that regulate fetal research, 12 of these states only prohibit research prior to or subsequent to an elective
abortion; most of the laws are connected to abortion legislation. ARrz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2302(A) (1993);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-17-802 (Michie 1991); CAL. HEALTh & SAFETY CODE § 25956(a) (West 1984); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.001(6) (West 1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-1-58.5-6 (West 1986); Ky. REV. STAT. § 436.026
(Baldwin 1993); MO. ANN. STAT. § 188.037 (Vernon 1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-346 (1989); OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.14(A) (Anderson 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735(A) (West 1994); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 39-15-208(a) (1991); WYO. STAT. § 35-6-115 (1994).
124. Baron, supra note 122, at 13; Eggen, supra note 31, at 668.
125. Eggen, supra note 31, at 668-69.
126. Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1299-1300; see Smith v. Hartigan, 556 F. Supp. 157, 162-64
(N.D. III. 1983) (deciding an infertile couple's challenge of a statute limiting embryological research, which
would have prohibited in vitro fertilization, was moot because the Illinois prosecutor indicated that the State
would not prosecute a couple seeking in vitro fertilization).
127. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 299.
128. Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1315-16.
129. Crossfire (CNN television broadcast, May 20, 1992) (interviewing Vice-President Dan Quayle)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal); see id. (citing the glorification of single motherhood-for
example, as seen on Murphy Brown- as a contributing factor to a lack of moral fiber in this nation, which in
turn, leads to poverty).
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Other fears relate to the misuse of the actual research procedures or the
results. The Eastern District Court of Louisiana, in Margaret S. v. Edwards
(Margaret S. I),t3o found that Louisiana had an interest in regulating experi-
mentation on embryos to protect its citizens from the "dangers of abuse inherent
in any rapidly developing field.' '31 Abuse is also a leading concern related to
eugenics. 132 While not specifically detailed in Margaret S. I, such abuses could
include discrimination against minorities or impoverished persons. This concern
encompasses not only attempts to created by genetically engineered offspring-
thereby disadvantaging those not genetically create, but also the investiture of
power over the selection decision in a small group of people who would, in effect,
have the power to judge the value of various genetic traits. This could very
easily lead down that slippery slope, that could be likened to Germany's selection
of superior traits for mankind-white, non-Jewish traits.
Based on these concerns, states tend to restrict procedures which could be
defined as embryological research in six areas: cryopreservation, preimplantation
screening, gene therapy, cell line development, twinning, and basic research.
34
There are also restrictions regarding commercialization of embryo research in
nineteen states, and two others have statutes regarding commercialization which
can be expanded by an administrative body to include embryos. 35
130. 488 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. La. 1980).
131. Margaret S. v. Edwards. 488 F. Supp 181, 221 (E.D. La. 1980) [hereinafter Margaret S. 1]. While
the statue at issue in Margaret S. I prohibited experimentation on fetuses in utero, this same concern of abuse
has applicability to embryological research.
132. Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1316-17.
133. Id. at 1316; Gore & Owens, supra note 4, at 353-55.
134. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 297-302; see supra note 15 (clarifying the term "embryological
research" as used in this Comment).
135. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 300. Eleven states and the District of Columbia completely ban
payments for embryos. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2601(b) (1995); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 873.05(1)-(3) (West 1994);
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 755 para. 50/8.1 (Smith-Hurd 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1991); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 145.422 Subd. (3) (West 1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(b)(3) (Supp. 1995); TEXAS
PENAL CODE ANN. § 48.02 (West 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-311 (1993); VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-289.1
(Michie 1992); see GA. CODE ANN. § 26-9957(a), (b) (1992) (permitting payments for embryos when used for
health services education); MIcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2690 (West 1992) (banning payments for embryos
which will be knowingly used illegally); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(f) (1994) (criminalizing the commerciali-
zation of embryo transfers when the transfers are not lawful). Four states exclude payments for embryos
specifically used for research. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112,
§ 12(J)(a)(IV) (Law. Co-op. 1996); MICt. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.10204(1) (West Supp. 1992); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-02.2-02(4) (1991). Five states use broadly written language to prohibit payments for body parts
which could be interpreted to include embryos. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7155(a)-(c) (West Supp.
1995); CAL PENALCODE § 367f(a)-(g) (West 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-280a(a)-(c) (West Supp.
1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tiL 16, § 2713(0 (1995); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 201.460 (Michie 1995); 35 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 10025(a) (1993). Furthermore, three states ban payments for body parts contained on an
enumerated list which at present does not contain embryos, but the statute permits the list to be expanded by
agency decision, possibly to include embryos. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 4307 (McKinney 1985); W. VA.
CODE § 16-19-7a (1995); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 146.345 (West 1989).
1352
1996/Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures
B. Cryopreservation
Cryopreservation is the process of freezing embryos removed from the
mother but not needed for the in vitro fertilization process at the time of fertili-
zation.136 The excess embryos are frozen at -196 degrees Centigrade in liquid
nitrogen. 137 This process enables a woman to avoid repeating the egg retrieval
process, thereby reducing emotional, physical and monetary costs should the first
attempt at childbirth fail. 38 This procedure, due to its novel and possibly
experimental nature, could be banned in five states if the vague wording of these
states' statutes were strictly construed and enforced. 39 Other states regulate the
procedure with reporting requirements and personnel or facility criteria.
140
Cryopreservation invokes state interests in the moral status of the embryo.'
4'
Based on the enactment of this legislation immediately subsequent to court
decisions striking anti-abortion laws, the overriding motivation for banning this
type of embryological research seems to be the fear of abortions. 142 By allowing
the cryopreservation of excess embryos, a woman may abort implanted embryos
136. Brown, supra note 36, at 188. Cryopreservation, while typically used during the in vitro fertilization
process, may also be used to store gametes prior to chemotherapy because chemotherapy often leads to sterility.
Norton, supra note 34, at 1596 n.73.
137. Brown, supra note 36, at 188.
138. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 33; see supra note 2 (outlining the expense of the in vitro fertilization
process, made even more costly because the success rate is so low); Brown, supra note 36, at 188-89; supra
notes 28-32 and accompanying text (describing the egg retrieval process, which includes ingesting hormones
to alter the mother's chemistry). While successful pregnancies have resulted from embryos implanted in a
woman after being cryopreserved for 38 months, the success rate for live births is less than 10%. Brown, supra,
at 189.
139. ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (Law.
Co-op. 1996); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1, 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-
01, 14-02.2-02 (1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a)-(c)
(1994); see infra notes 198-211 and accompanying text (discussing the court challenges to state embryological
research bans based on vagueness).
140. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-86-118(d) (Michie 1992) (establishing the medical facility
requirements for medical insurance reimbursement of in vitro fertilization procedures); HAW. REV. STAT. §
432:1-604(6) (1993) (requiring that medical insurance reimbursement be predicated on the in vitro fertilization
facilities meeting the standards of either the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology of the American
Fertility Society); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 215, para. 5/356m(b)(1)(c) (Smith-Hurd 1993) (describing the medical
facility requirements which must be met prior to medical insurance reimbursement of in vitro fertilization
expenses); LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 9:128 (West 1991) (codifying the in vitro fertilization facility and personnel
standards established by the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists and the American Fertility
Society); MD. CODE ANN. INS. art. 48a, §§ 477EE(6), 470W (1994) (establishing the medical facility
qualifications necessary to receive medical insurance reimbursement for in vitro fertilization procedures); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1, 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5 (Michie 1994) (delineating the criteria of facilities used to perform
in vitro fertilization so that the facilities may be reimbursed through medical insurance); 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
ANN. § 3213(e) (1983 & Supp. 1995) (listing the reporting requirements).
141. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 34-37; see id. (discussing the implications of excess frozen embryo
disposal and the moral issues involved with having excess embryos such that aborting an undesirable embryo
and harvesting organs from an embryo become viable alternatives).
142. Norton, supra note 34, at 1599-1603.
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in an attempt to give birth to exactly the child she wants. 43 Concern is also
focused on the potential for disruption of the family unit since cryopreservation
enables offspring to be born years later.' 44 For instance, a cryopreserved embryo
could be implanted in a great grandchild, resulting in the birth of the host
mother's great aunt. This could lead to psychological problems for the children,
as well as societal problems in such areas as probate.
C. Preimplantation Screening
Another reproductive procedure which utilizes embryos and is regulated by
state law is preimplantation screening. Preimplantation screening involves the
evaluation of preembryos for disease or birth defects. 45 After fertilization a one-
celled zygote begins to divide, until there are eight cells. 146 At this point, because
all cells have the potential to become any type of cell, scientists may remove a
single cell through a vacuuming procedure which can then be genetically analy-
zed. 47 Screening is very costly and is not covered by insurance. 48 This procedure
is currently feasible for many serious diseases, such as cystic fibrosis,'49
Duchenne muscular dystrophy, 50 and thalassemia.' 5'
Six of the ten states that ban embryological research exempt preimplantation
screening.' 52 The remaining four states prohibit screening unless it is shown to be
beneficial or without risk to the embryo.' 53 Additionally, there are two states
which prohibit research on an embryo prior to an abortion or when the embryo
143. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 34-37; see Norton, supra note 34, at 1599-1603 (discussing the use of
abortions and cryopreservation to select the "correct child" or provide for the availability of tissue matched
donors).
144. Eggen, supra note 31, at 664; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 34-37.
145. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 301. See generally Norton. supra note 34, at 1592-97
(discussing preimplantation genetic screening).
146. Norton, supra note 34, at 1594.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1597-98; see id. (noting that this results in a low demand, though the demand is anticipated
to rise); id. at 1598 (quoting Joseph D. Schulman, Director of the Genetics and IVF Institute in Fairfax,
Virginia, as reporting that although couples have inquired about preimplantation screening for cystic fibrosis
and chromosomal disorders which result in retardation, no one has used the procedure because of the cost).
149. See SLOANE, supra note 3, at 285 (defining "cystic fibrosis" as an hereditary dysfunction of the
exocrine glands which causes an obstruction of the pancreatic ducts, resulting in chronic pulmonary disease,
pancreatic deficiencies, and abnormally high levels of electrolytes in the sweat).
150. See id. (describing "Duchenne muscular dystrophy" as a chronic progressive disease characterized
by weakness of the muscles in the shoulder and pelvic girdles, causing a peculiar swaying gait and generally
leading to death by respiratory weakness or heart failure).
151. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 28; see SLOANE, supra note 3, at 723 (defining "thalassemia" as a rare
form of anemia that may result in skeletal deformation, cardiac enlargement, or splenomegaly).
152. MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (Law. Co-op. 1996); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 333.2686
(West 1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1, 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5
(Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01(3) (1991); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(b) (1994).
153. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:122, 9:129 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West
1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145A21 subd. 1, 2 (West 1989); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Supp. 1995).
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is intended to be aborted, even though these states have no general ban on
embryological research.
154
Often, commentators argue against the practical use of screening for repro-
ductive decision-making.'55 Some concerns center around using preimplantation
screening to select superior traits, which raises questions regarding who should
select these traits and what criteria should be used. 156 Other concerns relate to the
frivolous use of the screening process which could greatly affect society, such as
choosing male children which, if followed to its conclusion, would lead to the
extinction of humanity. 5 7 However, the concerns in preventing preimplantation
screening because of its impact on reproductive decision-making seems less com-
pelling given the Supreme Court's decision to constitutionally protect a woman's
right to choose an abortion. 8
Another issue is posed by the relationship between mandatory carrier
screening for genetic material and discrimination.'59 For instance, some people
might want to prohibit the birth of children with Sickle Cell anemia.' 6 Coin-
cidentally, this would curtail the births of Africans and their descendants who are
the carriers of Sickle Cell anemia. There may be justifiable interests in
maintaining the gene pool through nontherapeutic preimplantation genetic
screening.161 For example, decreasing the gene pool may make humans less
adaptable to our changing environment by culling genes which may be the very
genes which would mutate to solve an evolutionary problem. Additionally, the
state may have legitimate concerns related to the possibility of conducting
154. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.001 (West 1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-735 (West 1984).
155. Ephross, supra note 65, at 465; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 38; see Norton, supra note 34. at 1583-
89 (discussing the use of preimplantation screening for the purposes of eugenics, which would result in an
abortion if an undesirable trait is present).
156. See supra notes 102-04 and accompanying text (describing the fears regarding eugenics).
157. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text (proposing another hypothetical situation which
could occur if embryos were genetically screened for the purpose of selecting or avoiding certain traits, like
Sickle Cell anemia).
158. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 38-39.
159. Ephross, supra note 65, at 465-67; see Norton, supra note 34, at 1589 (relating one situation where
an insurer would not pay for genetic screening unless the couple agreed to abort the fetus if the fetus tested
positive for cystic fibrosis); id. at 1603-10 (discussing the implications of genetic screening on discrimination
through selection of certain types of embryos).
160. See SLOANE Supp., supra note 7, at 18 (defining "Sickle Cell anemia" as a type of inherited anemia
typically occurring in persons of African descent which is characterized by arthritic pain, acute attacks of
abdominal pain, and ulcerations of the lower extremities and is distinguishable from other forms of anemia by
sickle-shaped blood cells which impede the blood flow).
161. Norton, supra note 34, at 1612-13.
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nontherapeutic 62 screening for certain traits. 63 If the trait for which the embryo
is screened is linked to a trait necessary to avoid some detrimental effect, the
genetic screening process may create larger problems than it solves. For instance,
the Sickle Cell anemia trait would be beneficial to eliminate if viewed
independently, but this trait also provides a natural defense to malaria. Thus,
eliminating Sickle Cell anemia by avoiding the birth of children with that trait
could raise the incidence of malaria.
D. Gene Therapy
Another area which is regulated by state law is gene therapy.164 Gene therapy
is a process by which genetic material is added to an embryo in vitro in order to
cure genetic defects. 165 Genes are the command center of each cell, governing
their structure and functioning, t6 and faulty DNA within a gene may result in a
faulty structure or a malfunction. 67 Gene therapy replaces a faulty gene with the
hope of alleviating or curing the individual's genetic disease and of preventing the
defective genes from being passed on to future generations. 168 While gene therapy
has not yet been used on humans, the scientific community has paid increasing
attention to that possibility. 69 Cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs, Sickle Cell anemia and
162. See Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1374-75 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (discussing the meaning of
"nontherapeutie" as including not trying to help an embryo or not designed to benefit an embryo), cert. denied
sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991); Certified Blood Donor Serv., Inc. v. United States, 377
F. Supp. 964, 966-67 (Cust. Ct. 1974) (defining "therapeutic" as a remedial treatment for disease or a substance
or procedure that is healing, curative, or alleviative), rev'd on other grounds, 511 F.2d 572 (1975).
163. Norton, supra note 34, at 1612-13.
164. See infra note 172 and accompanying text (providing a list of state laws which restrict gene
therapy).
165. Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 305-06; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 40; see John B. Attanasio,
The Constitutionality of Regulating Human Genetic Engineering: Where Procreative Liberty and Equal
Opportunity Collide, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1274, 1282 (1986) (describing the process of recombinant DNA
technologies); see also infra note 372 (defining recombinant DNA procedures). See generally Dan L. Burk,
Patenting Transgenic Human Embryos: A Nonuse Cost Perspective, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1597, 1610-15 (1993).
166. Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 305. See generally Norton, supra note 34, at 1588-92 (discussing
genes and their processes).
167. Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 306.
168. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 301; Gore & Owens, supra note 4, at 352; Lagod & Martin,
supra note 8, at 306; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 40-41. Inserting cytokine genes into malignant cancer cells
is an example of somatic cell gene therapy and would cause the production of cytotoxic T cells as an immune
response to specifically target the tumorous growth. Steinbock, supra, at 28. This procedure would affect the
patient only, without disturbing the genetics of any future generations. Id.; see infra notes 175-76 and
accompanying text (exploring the significance of gene therapy which impacts future generations).
169. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 298.
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hemophilia170 are examples of genetically caused diseases which have the possi-
bility of being cured through gene therapy.
171
Although two of the ten states that prohibit experimental procedures appear
to prohibit gene therapy and the other eight states permit gene therapy, it is likely
that this procedure would be permissible in nine states.172 Because the technique
attempts to provide a health benefit to the embryo with minimal risk to the
embryo, gene therapy should be considered lawful in nine states since these states
do not interpret their bans on "experimentation" broadly enough to encompass
beneficial procedures-especially when the states have codified an exception for
beneficial techniques. 3
The state concerns about gene therapy centers around the creation of life and
the tampering with that life through unnatural means. 74 For instance, there are
two types of gene therapy: somatic cell gene therapy, which is performed on non-
reproductive cells; and germ-line cell therapy, which is performed on repro-
ductive cells. 75 Germ-line cell therapy could impact future generations by mani-
pulating reproductive cells which are then passed on to children. The NIH
recognizes these concerns and restricts funding to somatic cell gene therapy to
eliminate the likelihood that the therapy will affect more than the individual
treated.
76
170. See SLOANE SUPP., supra note 7, at 272 (describing "hemophilia" as a genetic disease which effects
the ability of the blood to coagulate, resulting in subcutaneous and intramuscular bleeding).
171. Gore & Owens, supra note 4, at 352; Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 305-06; see Lisa M Krieger,
Gene Therapy Buttresses Crucial Cells, S.F. EXAM., Apr. 3, 1996, at A-2 (announcing that research suggests
that gene therapy could prolong the lives of HIV positive patients).
172. Eight states permit procedures which would be beneficial to the embryo. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:121-133 (West 1991); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (Law. Co-op 1996); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN.
§§ 333.2686, 333.2692 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 subd. 1, 2 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§§ 24-9A-1, 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01, 14-02.2-02 (1991); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a)-(c) (1994). Maine prohibits any form
of experimentation. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992). New Hampshire bans the subsequent
transfer of an embryo into a uterus after the embryo has been donated for research. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §
168-B:15(II) (1994).
173. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 301.
174. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 40-42; see id. (citing examples of possible problems when gene therapy
is performed, such as injecting a gene for one characteristic that in turn effects the placement of organs, or
correcting a gene which causes both a genetic disease and provides a benefit, i.e. the Sickle Cell trait causes
a crippling, fatal disease in the offspring of two carriers but provides an immunity from malaria in carriers).
175. Id. at 28.
176. Id.; see id. (noting that the NIH will only fund research involving gene therapy on somatic cells,
or non-reproductive cells, as opposed to germ-line cells, or reproductive cells, which include eggs in women
and sperm in men). But see Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 306 n.348 (stating that some fear that somatic
cell research may transmit somatic cell changes unintentionally from an individual to the offspring). See
generally Attanasio, supra note 165 (discussing ethical and constitutional implications of positive genetic
engineering); Gore & Owens, supra note 4, at 351-52 (discussing the differences between somatic and germline
therapy).
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E. Cell Line Development
Cell line development is another medical technique which can be performed
on embryos. All ten states that prohibit embryological research have vaguely
worded statutes which could encompass cell line development if the statutes were
interpreted broadly. 177 States are more likely to enforce prohibitions against cell
line development than prohibitions against gene therapy because cell line
development is not considered beneficial to the mother or embryo, therefore
taking the procedure outside of the exceptions for beneficial medical pro-
cedures. 178 Cell line development involves implantation of altered embryos after
the procedure, raising the same concerns identified in somatic cell gene
therapy-the genetic impact on future generations. 179 However, some cell line
development could be characterized as non-experimental, thus removing it from
the scope of experimentation bans.180 Most frequently, the concerns with cell line
development involve commercialization and consent.',
F. Twinning
Twinning is another procedure which is limited by state law. 182 Researchers
duplicate, or "twin," embryos by dividing the embryo in half prior to implan-
tation.183 The process occurs by micromanipulation at the two-cell stage and the
resulting "twins" are allowed to mature to the six- to eight-cell stage until they are
ready for implantation.' 84 Twinning increases the embryos available for implan-
tation by doubling those retrieved through surgery, thus reducing the risks
177. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (Law. Co-op. 1996); MICH. CoMtp. LAWS ANN. §§ 333.2685, 333.2686,
333.2692 (West 1992); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 subd. 1, 2 (West 1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-
B:15(I1) (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-9A-1, 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-
02.2-01, 14-02.2-02 (1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a)-
(c) (1994); State Regulation, supra note 119, at 301.
178. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 301.
179. Id.
180. C. Ann Sheehan, Comment, Fetal Tissue Implants: An Explosive Technology Needs National
Action, 92 DICK. L. REV. 895, 901 (1988).
181. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 301; see, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 451.015 (Michie 1991)
(forbidding the use of an aborted embryo or fetus for any commercial purpose); cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. §
145.422 subd. (3) (West 1989) (permitting the sale of cell culture lines taken from non-living human embryos
or fetuses while banning the sale of living embryos, fetuses or nonrenewable organs). Consent issues relate to
the extent to which researchers inform the gamete providers about the profitable nature of cell lines. By
concealing the profitability, cell line developers may hope to sell the line without sharing the profit with the
provider.
182. See infra note 187 and accompanying text (listing state laws which restrict twinning).
183. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 300.
184. Van Blerkom, supra note 7, at 8. While twinning has been accomplished using human embryos,
the resulting "twins" have not been implanted. Gina Kolata, Researcher Clones Embryos of Human in Fertility
Effort, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1993, at Al.
1358
1996/Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures
inherent in additional surgical retrieval procedures, including not only those risks
associated with surgery, but also the risks of subjecting the mother to additional
hormonal treatments.18 5 Twinning is highly experimental and risky for the
embryo.8 6 This procedure would definitely fall within the definition of "experi-
mental," thus violating prohibitions in eight states'8 7 This research raises moral
issues since it may be viewed as creating life, and it impugns the rights of
twinned embryos by exposing them to greater risk. 88
G. Basic Research
Basic research is the final area that is prohibited by state embryological
research bans. Basic research, as the term is used in this Comment, refers both to
research for the gathering of new knowledge and the understanding of how
mechanisms work, and to applied research that takes the knowledge gained and
develops techniques and applications.' 9 This research differs from previously
discussed procedures that have already been developed. While the relevance of
basic research seems more remote, in context its use is imperative.' 9° Basic
research using human embryos may potentially assist in the development of can-
cer treatments and contraceptives in ways that research using animals will not.'9 '
The importance of using human research subjects cannot be underestimated. For
instance, many products have been found to cause cancer in lab animals. How-
ever, these results are based on attempts to duplicate the intake of humans. Such
results would not be questioned if they were based on human subjects and human
reactions.
Basic research incorporates many of the same concerns raised earlier, such
as the moral status of the embryo, the movement toward the creation of life, and
185. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 300.
186. Id.; Van Blerkom, supra note 7, at 8.
187. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-133 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (Law. Co-op 1996); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 subd. 1, 2 (West
1989); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-B:15(II) (1994); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.2-01 (1991); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3216(a) (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a)-(c) (1994); State Regulation, supra note 119,
at 300.
188. Steinbock, supra note 2, at 34-37; see id. at 36 (explaining that some oppose cloning because of
the possibility of preserving the cloned embryo for possible replacement body parts); id. at 37 (discussing the
fear that cloned embryos will be preserved in the hope of recreating the "perfect child" should the first born
child develop as such).
189. See generally Ferguson, supra note 101, at 640-42 (discussing the implications of the various types
of basic research); Lewis Thomas, Overview: Regulating Biotechnology, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 309, 312-13
(1985) (distinguishing the two types of research).
190. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 302.
191. Id.; see id. (noting that human research was necessary to determine the dangerousness of the
Rubella vaccine for pregnant women, since the initial research using monkeys indicated that the vaccine did
not cross the placenta, while research using human test subjects found the vaccine did cross the human
placenta).
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the religious concerns related to disposal of the embryo.9 2 Nine states ban non-
therapeutic basic research."93
II. CONSTITUTIONALITY
Federal courts have examined the constitutionality of embryological research
prohibitions in three states, Illinois, Louisiana, and Utah, based on challenges
asserted under the, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States
Constitution.' 94 While these lower court decisions are similar, the Supreme Court
has not expressed its view. The lower courts have looked at the right of
individuals to make reproductive decisions in association with the right to
privacy, as protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. They have also examined
the vagueness of the statutes to determine constitutionality. 95 The concept of
vagueness under the Fifth Amendment protects individuals from laws which are
so vague that those individuals cannot determine whether their conduct is
lawful.t96 Additionally, some commentators believe the courts could look to the
First Amendment's freedom of speech to protect the right to pursue knowledge
through research, although this has not been specifically addressed by any
court.19
A. Vagueness
The decisions that invalidated state embryological research bans held that the
laws were unconstitutional due to vagueness. 98 The laws which were invalidated
prohibited "experimentation" on embryos unless the procedures were
192. Id.
193. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-9:133 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West
1992); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J(a)(I) (Law. Co-op. 1996); MitcH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 333,2685,
333.2686, 333.2692 (West 1992); MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 subd 1, 2 (West 1989); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§
24-9A-1, 24-9A-3, 24-9A-5 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-02.2-01, 14-02.2-02 (1991); 18 PA. CONS.
STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-54-1(a)-(c) (1994).
194. Jane L. v. Bangerter, 61 F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995); Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D.
Ill. 1990), cert. denied sub nom. Scholberg v. Lifchez, 498 U.S. 1069 (1991); Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1986) [hereinafter Margaret S. 11].
195. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; Jane L, 61 F.3d at 1499-1502; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364, 1377;
Margaret S. II, 794 F.2d at 999; see Jane L, 61 F.3d at 1499-1502 (vagueness); Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364
(vagueness); id. at 1377 (reproductive decisions); Margaret S. II, 794 F.2d at 999 (vagueness); infra notes 212-
381 and accompanying text (suggesting that the Fourteenth Amendment's protection of personal liberties is
applicable to a constitutional analysis of state laws that prohibit embryological research).
196. U.S. CONST. amend. V; State Regulation, supra note 119, at 303; see infra notes 198-211 and
accompanying text (discussing vagueness as relates to the constitutionality of state embryological research
bans).
197. U.S. CONST. amend. I; see infra notes 382-450 (proposing that the First Amendment's protection
of the freedom of speech also protects the right to research, including a right to use embryos for research).
198. Jane L, 61 F.3d at 1500-02; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364, 1376; Margaret S. 11, 794 F.2d at 999.
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"therapeutic" to the embryo. 99 The crux of the interpretative problem is how to
define "experimentation" and "therapeutic" as used in the statutes of Illinois,
Louisiana, and Utah. °° Many doctors testified that experimentation has various
meanings.20' These include basic scientific research, using a procedure which is
not commonly utilized, and attempting a treatment method that is new to an
individual patient in hopes that it will aid the patient.2
Similar problems exist with the term "therapeutic." 3 In Lifchez v. Hartigan,
the court found that statements by the proponent of the law were contradictory as
to which procedures were prohibited and which were legal.2 Legal doctrine
dictates that when exceptions are codified, the legislation must be strictly inter-
preted to include all things which do not fall within those exceptions.2 5 One court
asked whether the statutory exception for in vitro fertilization includes only the
fertilization procedure, or those techniques which assist the fertilization
procedure, such as cryopreservation. ° This confusion was further exemplified
by a variety of techniques that may or may not be legal, including preimplantation
genetic screening, hormonal therapies which induce supra ovulation in a woman,
testing for certain cancers which originate in the fetus and can kill the mother, and
even such common occurrences as prescribing medications to pregnant women,
like aspirin for headaches."7 All of these procedures are beneficial to the mother
in some aspect, but are uncertain as to the affect on the fetus!" Because this
leaves the practitioner unable to determine what is beneficial to the fetus and what
is not, the practitioner is unable to know whether the conduct is lawful. Thus, the
statutes were found to violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee.2 9
199. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 51016 (Smith-Hurd 1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1299.35.13 (West
1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310 (1993); see ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 720, para. 510/6 (Smith-Hurd 1993)
(prohibiting any person from selling or experimenting on a fetus created by the fertilization of a human ovum
by a human sperm, unless the experimentation is therapeutic to the fetus) (emphasis added); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 1299.35.13 (West 1991) (forbidding anyone from experimenting on an unborn child or an aborted fetus
unless the experimentation is therapeutic to the unborn child or fetus) (emphasis added); UTAH CODE ANN.
§ 76-7-310 (1993) (prohibiting.experimentation using live, unborn children except where medical expertise
indicates that genetic testing is necessary) (emphasis added).
200. Jane L, 61 F.3d at 1500-01; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364; Margaret S. I1, 794 F.2d at 999.
201. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1500-01; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364-65.
202. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1500-01; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364-65; see Jane L., supra (noting that
"experimentation" has three possible meanings: 1) Procedures which are not routinely conducted by a specific
doctor or hospital, 2) procedures which are performed on one person while designed to benefit another person,
and 3) procedures designed to advance pure research and are not conducted to benefit the research subject).
203. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1364, 1370.
204. Id. at 1367-70.
205. Id. at 1368.
206. Id. at 1367-70.
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Jane L., 61 F.3d at 1502; Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1376; Margaret S. II, 794 F.2d 994,999 (5th Cir.
1986).
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Current state legislation regarding embryological research in at least seven
states could suffer from vagueness if the federal courts in Louisiana, Illinois, and
Utah are correct in their interpretation of "experimentation" and "therapeutic. 2 0
If the statutes are ruled unconstitutionally vague, the laws could be struck entirely
or the vague portions could be excised in a way that preserves the legislative
intent.2" While there has been no Supreme Court holding on the specificity or
vagueness of terms such as "experimentation" and "therapeutic," vagueness
defects can be corrected by clearly defining such terms.
B. Right to Privacy
Another constitutional area which might afford protection for various medical
procedures that use human embryos is the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
privacy. The right to privacy has developed from the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of personal liberties in the Due Process Clause, although the right is
guaranteed in other areas of the Constitution as well.2! 12 The Supreme Court has
discussed the right to privacy in a variety of areas, including reproductive
choice,213 marital relationships, 214family relationships, 216hild rearing, 2 ind
education.21 7
1. Fundamental Rights
The Supreme Court has limited the application of the right to privacy to
fundamental rights.2 8 While activity associated with sexual conduct is generally
210. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:121-:133 (West 1991); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1593 (West 1992);
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 112, § 12J (Law. Co-op. 1996); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 145.422 (West 1989); N.D. CENT.
CODE §§ 14-02.2-01, 14-02.2-02 (1991); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3216 (Supp. 1995); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
11-54-1 (1994).
211. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1377; Margaret S. II, 794 F.2d at 999.
212. See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973) (associating the right to privacy with the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights and the Ninth Amendment, as well as the Fourteenth Amendment); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (noting that the right to privacy is based on the Bill of Rights,
including the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments).
213. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (abortion); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (abortion); Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541-42 (1942) (procreation).
214. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (marriage).
215. See Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-20 (1984) (family relationships); Moore
v. City of East Cleveland, Ohio, 431 U.S. 494,499 (1977) (family life); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453-
54 (1972) (family relationships).
216. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (child rearing), reh g denied, 321 U.S. 804
(1944).
217. Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters of the Holy Names of Jesus & Mary,
268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925) (educational decisions regarding children); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,
400 (1923) (education).
218. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-24 (1989); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 191-92
(1986), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1037.
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protected as a fundamental right, like access to contraception for both married and
unmarried people, the Supreme Court has denied that all activities associated with
sexual conduct are protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.21 9 In Bowers v.
Hardwick,220 the Court addressed a law banning sodomy between consenting
adults as applied to homosexuals. 2 ' The Court found that sodomy was not a right
rooted in our nation's history or implicit in the concept of liberty.
222
More recently, in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,223 a plurality tried to define
"fundamental" rights which would necessitate constitutional protection.Y4
"Fundamental" rights should include liberty interests which society has tradi-
tionally protected, according to the plurality opinion.2 5 The dissent believed that
the emphasis should not be on traditionally protected interests, but on interests
which society has traditionally found important.226 Thus, defining the interest as
"protected" narrows the interpretation to specific conduct, while the dissent's use
of the word "important" allows a more expansive and general characterization of
the activity. In Michael H., the interest that was not traditionally protected was
that of a relationship outside of the unitary family-a father's relationship to his
illegitimate child born to a mother who is married to another.2 27 The dissent
characterized this interest in the more expansive method under the "important"
terminology as an interest in parenthood. 228 Although the Supreme Court has
protected abortion and contraception under the Fourteenth Amendment's right to
privacy, there is some indication that these specific activities are not fundamental
rights, but are generally protected because they are "essential to [the] exercise of
the constitutionally protected right of decision in matters of childbearing" as
219. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192; see id. (upholding the constitutionality of a state law banning sodomy
between consenting adults); Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453-54 (holding that there is no rational basis to
differentiate between unmarried couples, who could not purchase contraceptives, and married couples, who
have a right to have access to contraception); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965) (finding that
a ban on access to contraception violates a married couple's right to privacy). The Bowers Court specifically
declined to address the issue as it relates to heterosexual couples. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
220. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
221. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192.
222. Id. at 191-92.
223. 491 U.S. 110 (1989); see id. at 124 (holding that the natural father of a child, who was not the
husband of the mother, did not have a right to maintain a relationship with the child because of a state law that
presumed that a child born while the mother was living with her husband was a child of the marriage).
224. Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 122-24 (1989).
225. Id. But see Bowers, 478 U.S. at 191-92 (setting forth a two prong test to determine whether a right
falls within the zone of privacy--(1) whether the right is "'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"' and (2)
whether the right is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition"); Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599-
600 (1977) (describing the right to privacy as an "interest in independence in making certain kinds of important
decisions").
226. Michael H., 491 U.S. at 139-41 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see id. (finding that the interest was one
in parenthood, an interest society has traditionally recognized as important).
227. Id. at 124.
228. Id. at 139-41 (Brennan, L, dissenting).
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stated in the underlying foundation of the holdings in Griswold v. Connecticut,
229
Eisenstadt v. Baird,230 and Roe v. Wade.'23
a. Reproductive Technologies as Fundamental Rights
At least four of the areas curtailed by state laws-cryopreservation, pre-
implantation screening, gene therapy, and twinning-are associated with pro-
creation, which is a traditionally protected area.232 Thus, these various procedures
could be generally characterized as specific liberties or means by which one
exercises the more general right of procreation ?
33
i. Embryo Cryopreservation and Embryo Twinning
Embryo cryopreservation and embryo twinning qualify as protected interests
based on the line of cases addressing abortion and contraception. This line of
cases held that procreation is a fundamental right.3 Both procedures are used to
actually promote procreation,'2 5 and can be characterized as "essential to [the]
exercise of the ... right of decision in matters of childbearing.' ' 5 The Margaret
S. v. Treen (Margaret S. iii)237 court stated that reproductive choice is not limited
to "abortion decisions ... but extends to both childbirth and contraception. 238
Additionally, in Margaret S. III the court held, that "the woman's privacy right
encompasses the entire process surrounding abortion" in a second challenge to the
Louisiana statute.2 9 Logically, the fundamental right encompassing procreation
should encompass the entire process as well.240 Thus, "[i]t takes no great leap of
logic to see that within the cluster of constitutionally protected choices that
includes the right to have access to contraceptives, there must be included within
229. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
230. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
231. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,688-89 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
232. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851-60 (1992).
233. Norton, supra note 34, at 1622; see Casey, 505 U.S. at 846 (defining a woman's interest in abortion
as the specific "liberty" to choose abortion, rather than as a more general right to not procreate); Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 453 (discussing the means by which a woman could carry out her reproductive decision).
234. See supra notes 213-15 (listing cases identifying reproduction as a fundamental right).
235. See supra notes 136-38, 183-85 and accompanying text (describing the processes of embryo
cryopreservation and embryo twinning and how these relate to procreation).
236. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 688-89 (1977).
237. Margaret S. v. Treen, 597 F. Supp. 636 (E.D. La. 1984) [hereinafter Margaret S. 111], aff'd sub nor.
Margaret S. 11, 794 F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986).
238. Margaret S. II, 597 F. Supp. at 673.
239. Id. at 671. The Fifth Circuit declined to discuss the right to privacy issues upon appeal, but instead
found the statute unconstitutionally vague. Margaret S. 11, 794 F.2d 994. 999 (5th Cir. 1986).
240. Eggen, supra note 31, at 655.
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that cluster the right to submit to a medical procedure that may bring about, rather
than prevent pregnancy."24'
ii. Preimplantation Screening
The right to procreative freedom also justifies preimplantation diagnostic
testing, fitting squarely within the fundamental rights outlined in the abortion
cases because of this procedure's connection to reproduction through in vitro
fertilization.2 42 The Lifchez court noted that "the constitutional choices that
include the right to abort a fetus within the first trimester must also include the
right to submit to a procedure designed to give information about that fetus which
can then lead to a decision to abort., 243 Specifically, the Margaret S. III court's
rationale is more directly applicable in this situation since fundamental rights
"encompa[ss] the entire process surrounding the abortion," including procedures
that aid in making a reproductive decision like preimplantation diagnostic
testing.' 44 Also, the Margaret S. III holding stated that prohibiting diagnostic
testing "violated the fundamental rights of women ... to make reproductive
choices" and was overly burdensome to a woman's decision to have an
abortion.245
iii. Gene Therapy
Gene therapy also appears to be a fundamental liberty because of the intent
to benefit the embryo.246 Gene therapy corrects genetic defects by replacing the
faulty gene.247 The issues arising in this situation can be analogized to the privacy
right inherent in child rearing.248 Courts have held that parents, as primary care
241. Lifchez v. Hartigan, 735 F. Supp. 1361, 1377 (N.D. 11. 1990). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113,
152-53 (1973) (clarifying that right to privacy implications have "some extension to activities relating to
marriage .... procreation.... [and] contraception") (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
242. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 687-88 (1977); see id. (holding that the right to
choose an abortion necessarily includes the right of access to information to effectuate one's choice). See
generally Clapp, supra note 121, at 1086-87, 1089.
243. Lifchez, 735 F. Supp. at 1377; cf. Robertson, supra note 8, at 965 n.79 (suggesting that procedures
that allow the selection of certain characteristics in an offspring may be outside the zone of privacy which has
been traditionally recognized by society as the right to procreate).
244. Margaret S. III, 597 F. Supp. 636, 673 (E.D. La. 1984), affid sub nom. Margaret S. II, 794 F.2d
994 (5th Cir. 1986).
245. Id.; see Eggen, supra note 31, at 655 (suggesting that "research" which has a sufficient connection
to reproductive freedom will be constitutionally protected).
246. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 301.
247. Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 305-06; Steinbock, supra note 2, at 40.
248. Attanasio, supra note 165, at 1300-01.
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givers, have a duty to care for and nurture the child. 249 Additionally, in Bowen v.
American Hospital Assoc.,2' the Supreme Court noted a strong presumption that
parents are appropriate decision-makers.25t The Court found the state an inappro-
priate decision-maker by invalidating as unconstitutional a mandatory treatment
statute for handicapped newborns.5 2 Thus, gene therapy, used to care for and
hopefully cure the child, would fall within that group of actions that a parent takes
to fulfill his or her custodial duties.z 3
Wrongful life and wrongful birth cases related to a physician's failure to
provide information regarding genetic defects support the conclusion that gene
therapy is a medical treatment decision best left to the parent5 4 While courts
have generally declined to recognize a child's wrongful life action, they have
readily accepted claims made by the parents for wrongful birth due to misin-
formation by the doctor.25 Thus, the courts seem to indicate a preference for
leaving medical treatment issues to the parents, whose options may include drug
249. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944);
see Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651 (noting that the right to raise one's children is an essential, basic civil right of man,
a right far more precious than any property right). Stanley seems to indicate that raising, which includes caring,
is a "fundamental right" because society has traditionally recognized raising children as a right that should be
protected. Id. at 650-53.
250. 476 U.S. 610 (1986).
251. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 637-28 n.1 3; see United States v. University Hosp. of State Univ. of New York
at Stony Brook, 575 F. Supp. 607, 616 (E.D. N.Y. 1983) (holding that government involvement in choosing
between alternative reasonable medical treatments for handicapped children raises grave right to privacy
concerns), aff'd, 729 F.2d 144 (2d Cir. 1984); In re Seiferth, 127 N.E.2d 820, 823 (N.Y. 1955) (granting
discretionary authority to parents regarding medical treatment of their children when there is no present
emergency). But see Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37-39 (1905) (upholding compulsory
vaccinations to which the parents and children object); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899-900 (1985)
(ordering a blood transfusion for a mother, against her will, to benefit her unborn fetus); Attanasio, supra note
165, at 1301-04 (proposing arguments which invalidate the propriety of parents making decisions related to
the genetic engineering of their own embryos). See generally John M. Maciejczyk, Note, Withholding
Treatment from Defective Infants: "Infant Doe" Postmortem, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 224 (1983) (analyzing
the Infant Doe cases which affirmed the parent's right to make important medical decisions for offspring
because the parent's rights outweighed the child's rights in light of the fact that the child lacked an opportunity
for a minimally adequate life); Shannon K. Such, Note, Lifesaving Medical Treatment for the Nonviable Fetus:
Limitations on State Authority Under Roe v. Wade, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 961, 969 n.48 (1986) (discussing
the constitutional right of parents to make decisions regarding their children); Yolanda V. Vorys, Comment,
The Outer Limits of Parental Autonomy: Withholding Medical Treatment From Children, 42 OHto ST. L.J. 813
(1981) (examining the breadth of parental ability to withhold medical treatment from children). It should be
noted that decisional authority and criteria vary from state to state. Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 274 n.150.
252. Bowen, 476 U.S. at 627-28 n.13.
253. Attanasio, supra note 165, at 1300-01. Attanasio also argues that bans on gene therapy should be
unconstitutional because other reproductive technologies are constitutionally permitted, thus government
prohibitions in the method of reproductive technology used should be unconstitutional based on the Equal
Protection Clause. Id. at 1288-90; see id. (arguing that genetic manipulations which aid in procreation are
supported as a fundamental right by a myriad of traditions).
254. Id. at 1298-1301.
255. Id. at 1298; PRossER AND KEErON ON THE LAW OF ToR 370 (E. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th cd.
1984).
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therapy, monitoring, and perhaps even gene therapy. 6 Further evidence of the
parent's ability to make choices for the child, overriding the possible interests of
the child, include the ability to abort a fetus based on the sex of the fetus 7
b. Cell Line Development and Basic Research
Because cell line development and basic research using embryos gives no
direct, immediate benefit or therapy to a mother or an embryo, such procedures
are-more difficult to categorize as fundamental interests 5 8 However, the limited
case where a mother or future embryo would benefit from a cure for a genetic
defect carried by the parents is more easily developed. For example, cell line
development could be used therapeutically to cure a genetically faulty embryo.
Additionally, curing future genetic defects in offspring will lead to future
procreation of healthy generations, and procreation is traditionally a protected
area.259 The familial relationships involved lend credence to the fundamental
nature of this zone of privacy as well. Therefore, cell line development and basic
research that would cure a genetic defect that is carried by the parents seem to fall
within a zone of privacy.
i. Basic Research as Fundamental Knowledge
While basic research and cell line development that do not directly benefit the
family unit are not as readily classified as fundamental rights as those procedures
that assist in procreation or benefit the embryo, commentators have proposed
various arguments that would support classifying cell line development and basic
embryological research as a fundamental right.260 Basic research for the pursuit
of fundamental knowledge is connected to our democratic history, and is
traditionally protected through impassioned rhetoric.
261 In Meyer v. Nebraska,262
256. Attanasio, supra note 165, at 1299.
257. Id. at 1299-1300.
258. State Regulation, supra note 119, at 302.
259. See supra note 234 and accompanying text (labeling procreation as a fundamental right).
260. See infra notes 261-70 and accompanying text. But see Margaret S. 1, 488 F. Supp. 181, 220-21
(E.D. La. 1980) (holding that the right of medical researchers to engage in fetal research is not fundamental
under the Constitution); Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (stating that medical
researchers did not have a fundamental right to conduct research using fetuses), afd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey,
599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
261. Clifford Grobstein, Regulation and Basic Research: Implications of Recombinant DNA, 51 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1181, 1186 (1978); see National Cooperative Productions Amendment of 1993, 15 U.S.C.A. § 4301
historical note (West Supp. 1996) (enacted by Pub. L. No. 103-42 § 2(a)(1), 107 Stat. 117 § 2(a)(l)) (noting
legislative findings that technological advancements through research should be promoted because this research
leads to commercial opportunities which will raise the standard of living within the United States); Rebecca
Dresser, Research in Animals: Values, Politics, and Regulatory Reform, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 1147, 1147 (1986)
(noting that our nation has traditionally been suspicious of governmental restrictions on scientific research);
Ferguson, supra note 101, at 640-41 (commenting on Western traditions of not restricting research based on
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the Supreme Court appeared to recognize this traditional protection, by stating
that the Fourteenth Amendment protects the freedom "to acquire useful know-
ledge."263 While Meyer addressed children's right to learn a modem language
other than English in grammar school, basic research is specifically related to
acquiring useful knowledge.2  Also, in Henley v. Wise,265 a district court stated
that the "right of scholars to do research and advance the state of man's know-
ledge" was a protected activity.? Based on these statements by the courts, basic
research clearly falls within the Michael H. court's definition of fundamental
rights-those which society has traditionally protected-because the courts have
protected this right since 1923.267
ii. Basic Research as a Burden on Reproductive Decision-
Making
Some commentators have argued that bans on research are a direct and
indirect burden on the ability to make reproductive decisions-either to procreate
or to terminate a pregnancy-by "freez[ing] information at an arbitrary point in
the sanctity of knowledge and the inherent value of intellectual freedom); Gary L. Francione, Experimentation
and the Marketplace Theory of the First Amendment, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 417, 419 n.2 (discussing concern
during congressional hearings on amendments to the Animal Welfare Act over the right to research, such that
amendments were drafted so as to survive constitutional analysis based on the right to research); see also
Richards of Rockford, Inc. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., 71 F.R.D. 388, 390 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (stating that
"society has a profound interest in the research of its scholars, work which has the unique potential to facilitate
change through knowledge"); United States v. Doe, 460 F.2d 328, 333-34 (1st Cir. 1972) (suggesting that the
continued flow of information to researchers is an important public interest), cert. denied sub nom. Popkin v.
United States, 411 U.S. 909 (1973); Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62, 66 (N.D. Ind. 1969) (noting society's
protection of the "right of scholars to do research and advance the state of man's knowledge"); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (listing "scientific value" among the criteria that would prevent sexually
oriented material from being found obscene, and thus unprotected), reh'g denied, 414 U.S. 881. See generally
Richard Delgado & David R. Millen, God, Galileo, and Government: Toward Constitutional Protection for
Scientific Inquiry, 53 WASH. L. REV. 349,392-94 (1978) (noting possible arguments which support a finding
that scientific research is a fundamental right). But see John A. Robertson, The Scientist's Right to Research:
A ConstitutionalAnalysis, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1203, 1214 (1977) [hereinafter Right to Research] (opposing the
notion that the right to research has been traditionally protected by society).
262. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
263. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399; see Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1212-13 (suggesting that more
recent Supreme Court decisions which relied on Meyer support the recognition of the ability to research as a
fundamental right); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 165-66 (1973) (affirming the physician's right to
administer medical treatment up to the point where compelling state interests exists). But see Right to Research,
supra, at 1213-14 (questioning the plausibility of the Supreme Court recognizing the right to research as a
personal liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy).
264. Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
265. 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969).
266. Henley, 303 F. Supp. at 66.
267. See supra notes 218-31 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's definition of "fundamental
right').
1368
1996/Analysis of State Laws Banning Embryological Procedures
time and halt[ing] the use and development of new medical procedures."268 The
Supreme Court has voiced a strong objection to governmental interference which
overly burdens reproductive choices 269 By freezing reproductive technology at
this point in time, abortion foes can rest easier in the knowledge that society will
not gain the technology to make reproductive decisions based on genetics. How-
ever, this connection to reproductive decision-making is yet a further indication
that embryological research should be considered a fundamental right that has a
history of societal protection.
iii. Basic Research as Medical Care
Another suggestion has been made that beneficiaries of fetal tissue donation
may constitutionally attack total bans on fetal tissue donation as impermissibly
infringing on society's belief in the right to medical care.270 Society has long
protected the right to medical treatment by establishing health care entitlement
programs for the poor. Additionally, hospitals support this societal approval by
providing medical care in emergency rooms to indigents and writing off the
portions of bills that can never be collected. A similar argument can be made for
embryological research, albeit the beneficiaries may be unknown at the time of
the research. Based on these connections to traditionally protected activities,
embryological research should be recognized as a fundamental right.
However, the relationship between these analogies and rights traditionally
protected by society may seem too tenuous to some and analogies to societal pro-
tection afforded individuals in the disposal of the dead and organ donation may
be helpful in posing a more forceful argument for recognizing basic research and
cell line development as a fundamental right, even when there is no connection
to the family unit. Specifically, analogies to the traditional right in the next-of-kin
to dispose of their dead, a quasi-property right in the deceased's body, and the
right to control one's organs after removal are especially helpful?'T
268. Clapp, supra note 121, at 1086-90; see Rebecca J. Cook, Human Rights and Reproductive Self-
Determination. 44 Am. U. L. REV. 975, 1002-04 (1995) (discussing the implications of the United Nation's
right to the benefits of scientific research as listed in the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Right, including embryological research as relates to women's rights).
269. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 874 (1992).
270. Danis, supra note 26, at 1103.
271. See infra notes 272-76 and accompanying text (suggesting that analogies to the quasi-property right
in the deceased body aid in determining that basic research and cell line development are a fundamental right);
infra notes 277-89 and accompanying text (proposing that a respect for the ability to give bodily gifts indicates
that disposal of excess embryos for basic research and cell line development are traditionally protected, thus
making these procedures a fundamental right).
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iv. Basic Research and the Next-of-Kin's Right to Dispose
of the Deceased
Courts recognize a traditional "quasi-property" right in a corpse, which
includes the time-honored right in the next-of-kin to dispose of a body without
interference, and the newly recognized right to donate organs. 272 This recognition
is derived from a long history of common law.2 73 Many cases question the
appropriateness of governmental intervention that is at odds with the wishes of
the next-of-kin. 274 This quasi-property right in dead bodies and organs has been
recognized by society as a right which should be protected, thus fulfilling the
Supreme Court's definition of a "fundamental right"--a right traditionally
protected by society.275 Since embryos which are not implanted are in a technical
sense "dead, ' 276 the gamete providers, as the next-of-kin, should have the right
to dispose of the "body," including disposing of it through research use.
272. E.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477,481 (6th Cir. 1991); Erik S. Jaffe, Note, 'She's Got
Bette Davis[s] Eyes': Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the Takings and Due
Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 528, 543-44 (1990); see Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482 (invalidating a state
law which mandated removal of comeas from the deceased against the wishes of the next-of-kin, the wife in
this case); Arnaud v. Odom, 870 F.2d 304, 307-09 (5th Cir. 1989) (noting the next-of-kin's right over the
deceased as relates to a coroner performing various impact experiments on twins which had died from trauma
to the head), cert. denied sub nom. Tolliver v. Odom, 493 U.S. 855; McCoy v. Georgia Baptist Hosp., 306
S.E.2d 746, 747-48 (Ga. 1983) (determining the propriety of a hospital to hold the body of a stillborn infant
in a freezer for a month without burying the infant); Snyder v. Holy Cross Hosp., 352 A.2d 334, 341 (Md.
1976) (recognizing the next-of-kin's right in the body of the deceased, although denying a request to stay the
autopsy of a son when the autopsy was against the religious beliefs of the father).
273. William Boulier, Note, Sperm, Spleens, and Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property
Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 HoFsTRA L. REv. 693,707-11 (1995); see id. (tracing the development of the
next-of-kin's quasi-property right in the deceased's body). Certain disposal methods are more acceptable than
others, with the distinction related to the proper respect of the dead. Feinberg, supra note 92, at 31-32
(explaining the acceptance of pathological research involving cadavers and autopsies in light of society's
nonacceptance of cadavers used in research as "crash dummies" is due to the difference between society's view
of medical technicians in spotless exam rooms "radiating the newly acquired symbolic respectability of
professional medicine" and the violent accidents resulting in the cadavers being smashed to bits).
274. See supra notes 272-73 and accompanying text (listing several instances where the governmental
regulations were contrary to the wishes of the next-of-kin).
275. Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985), cert. denied sub nom.
Lavant v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 475 U.S. 1084; Rivers v. Greenwood Cemetery, Inc., 22 S.E. 2d 134, 135 (Ga.
1942); Pollard v. Phelps, 193 S.E. 102, 107 (Ga. Ct. App. 1937); Boulier, supra note 273, at 718; see Arnaud,
870 F.2d at 307-08 (recognizing that parents had a property interest in their infant's corpse when the state
recognized a quasi-property interest which was constitutionally protected based on due process); Feinberg,
supra note 92, at 31-32 (noting society's general acceptance of medical research using cadavers). But see
Feinberg, supra note 92, at 31-32 (discussing Congressman Moss's angry letter denouncing the use of cadavers
by the Department of Transportation in research as crash dummies because such use "violates fundamental
notions of morality and human dignity" as an example of society's intolerance of some methods of disposal
that the next-of-kin might choose).
276. See SLOANE SUPP., supra note 7, at 153-54 (defining "death" as a lack of brain, respiratory and
circulatory activity); id. (describing "fetal death" as a fetus who does not exhibit respiratory functions, heart
beats, or muscle movement when the fetus is outside of the uterus); WEBSTER'S, supra note 16, at 579 (defining
"dead" as not able to sustain life). Embryos which are not implanted are unable to sustain life.
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v. Basic Research and Organ Donations
Society's acceptance, protection and promotion of organ donations lends
further credence to the proposition that embryological research is a fundamental
right. All fifty state legislatures have recognized the importance of promoting
bodily gifts by passing the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 277 which recognizes an
interest in control over one's body parts that is rooted in personal freedom and
dignity.278 The right to provide bodily gifts is an important aspect of a large
society.279 This gift-giving provides a connection through "shared embodiment
and expression of personal dignity. 280 While these needs are more adequately
met when the organ is used directly for a specific human being, donation for
research also answers these needs by providing cures and eliminating defects,
thus benefiting the larger society rather than an individual. Arguably, this has a
greater altruistic effect because a greater number of society-members benefit from
the donation. Since society has recognized that this important aspect needs to be
free from governmental interference, as evidenced by society's rejection of
mandatory donation laws, embryological research appears to meet the criteria for
a "fundamental right."28'
The concepts of bodily integrity and autonomy are promoted by society, and
bodily integrity and autonomy have traditionally been protected by the courts, as
well as by society. Courts have recognized that people have an ultimate right of
control over their bodily tissues, fluids, and organs.282 Also, many commentators
have discussed the right to autonomy, or bodily integrity, associated with organ
donation and have denounced mandatory donation laws.2 83 This is further
evidence that society wishes to protect the right to bodily integrity. Bodily
integrity and the right not to be governed by the state in setting the physical
277. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFr ACT § 8A U.L.A. (1987) (providing regulations regarding organ
donations for research and transplant purposes).
278. Id. at 20 (prefatory note); Sharon Nan Perley, Note, From Control Over One's Body to Control
Over One's Body Parts: Extending the Doctrine of Inforned Consent, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 335, 351 (1992). See
generally UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT §§ 1-14, 8A U.L.A. 29 (1987).
279. Rhonda G. Hartman, The Privacy Implications of Professor Anderson's Proposed Mandatory
Registryfor Bone Marrow Donation: A Reply, 54 U. PITr. L. REV. 531, 538 (1993).
280. Feinberg, supra note 92, at 32; Hartman, supra note 279, at 539.
281. See e.g., Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991) (striking down a mandatory
cornea donation law in response to a claim by deceased's widow); supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text
(discussing how the Supreme Court in Michael H. defined "fundamental right" as something society has
traditionally protected); see also ALVIN W. DRAKE, THE AMERICAN BLOOD SUPPLY 3-6 (1982) (commenting
on society's rejection of government regulated blood donation and participating en masse in voluntary gifting
of blood in both England and the United States); Nan Perley, supra note 278, at 352-53 (arguing that
individual's should have the right to designate what purposes for which the donated organs may be used).
282. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 51 Cal. 3d 120, 129, 793 P.2d 479, 483,271 Cal. Rptr.
146, 150 (1990). cert. denied, 499 U.S. 936 (1991).
283. Legal Status, supra note 83, at 402-06; Danis, supra note 26, at 1102-03; Hartman, supra note 279,
at 544-50; Robertson, supra note 8, at 978-81.
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parameters of one's personal identity are two of the foundations of personal
dignity and self esteem.2  Our society recognizes that the human body provides
an individual with a point of separation between the community, or society, and
the individual's personhood.285
An additional argument can be made based on the gamete providers' role as
parents. Logically, the persons providing the gametes, the parents, should have
the primary decision-making authority over the gametes due to the genetic link
between the two.2s6 This is consistent with how the Bowers dissent proposes to
define the right to privacy--"the right to be let alone.' 287 After all, a state's
intrusion into bodily integrity raises fears of the Moral Majority imposing value
judgements on the minority. 8 However, some commentators feel that once that
decision-making authority is transferred to another-such as a researcher-the
zone of privacy surrounding procreative freedom might not encompass the desires
of the transferee.2 9
2. Compelling State Interest
Once a zone of privacy is identified, courts have held that the state must have
narrowly drawn the regulation to serve a compelling, justified interest in order for
the government to constitutionally intrude into this zone. 90 The abortion cases
indicate that the overriding compelling interest is determined by balancing the
mother's interests against those of the state. 291 Because of the similarity between
the mother's interests as they relate to obtaining an abortion and the parents'
284. Hartman, supra note 279, at 545. See generally Edward J. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 962 (1964).
285. Hartman, supra note 279, at 545.
286. Hecht v. Sup. Ct. (Kane), 16 Cal. App. 4th 836, 849-50, 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 275, 283 (1993);
Robertson, supra note 8. at 976. Courts and laws continue to distinguish a mass of tissues with the potential
for life (an embryo or fetus) from an "organ," justifying further limitations on the gamete donors beyond those
implicated as a traditional organ donor, such as those limited property interests in burial and body donation.
Id. at 976; see UNiF. ANATOMICAL GIF AcT § 3(b)(3), 8A U.L.A. 40 (1987) (permitting the donation of fetal
tissue by the parent, which infers that the tissue mass is not another organ, but has some identity separate from
the parent); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973) (weighing the interests of the state in protecting the
fetus and the mother, adding to the premise that a fetus is not an "organ," but has a separate, distinct identity
from the mother).
287. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (quoting Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)), reh'g denied, 478 U.S. 1039; see supra
notes 219-22 and accompanying text (discussing the implications of the Bowers decision).
288. Thomburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 776-77 (1986)
(Stevens, J., dissenting).
289. Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1327-28; Robertson, supra note 8, at 976. This hurdle may be
overcome by remembering that basic research and cell line development is meant to benefit people in the areas
of procreation and health.
290. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973).
291. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
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interests as they relate to procedures utilizing embryos, the court may look to
abortion case law, as well as other case law involving fetuses, for state interests
that may be implicated by embryological research bans.
a. State Interests
i. Interests Related to Protecting the Life of the Fetus
Courts have recognized a variety of state interests which could outweigh a
person's right to bodily autonomy which are applicable to the donation of
embryos for research purposes.292 In Superintendent of Belchertown State School
v. Saikewicz, 293 the Massachusetts Supreme Court summarized several court
opinions to develop a list of interests that the State had in treating a man for
cancer which could outweigh the man's right to bodily integrity and, thus, permit
the State to compel medical treatment.294 These include the preservation of life,
the protection of innocent third parties, the prevention of suicide, and the main-
tenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.295 The first two are
relevant to embryological research. The last two interests, that do not appear to
be applicable to the question of the constitutionality of embryological research
bans, have had their validity questioned.
2 96
The Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey297 court recognized
that the State has a compelling interest in protecting and preserving the life of the
fetus, an innocent third party, from the outset of the pregnancy.298 However, the
legitimacy of a state's interest in protecting the life of an embryo that is not
implanted remains unanswered since the pregnancy has not actually begun 9
While a state's interest in an embryo is arguably compelling, the state must still
satisfy the balancing test used in Roe and Casey to determine if, and when, the
292. See Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977)
(providing a list of court decisions which identified state interests in violating a person's right to bodily
integrity).
293. 370 N.E.2d 417 (Mass. 1977).
294. Id. at 425.
295. Id.; see also In re President & Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000, 1008-09 (D.C.
1964), cert. denied sub nom. Jones v. President & Directors of Georgetown College Inc., 377 U.S. 978 (1964);
Bartling v. Superior Court, 163 Cal. App. 3d 186, 195, 209 Cal. Rptr. 220, 224 (1984); John F. Kennedy
Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 279 A.2d 670, 672-74 (N.J. 1971).
296. Brian P. Buggy, et al., Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: "Compelling Each to Live
as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASTINGS L.J. 703, 759-61 (1986); see id. (questioning the strength of these
interests to compel any medical treatment).
297. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
298. Casey, 505 U.S. at 870-71.
299. Id. at 871; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973); see Casey, 505 U.S. at 871 (discussing the
state interest after the pregnancy had begun); SLOANE SUPP., supra note 7, at 429 (clarifying that a woman is
not considered "pregnant" until the embryo begins to develop within the uterus).
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governmental interests override the interests of the parents. 3 'It is hard to imagine
a state interest in an entity with less legal standing than a fetus that would rise
above the bond between the embryo and its creators, a bond which gains
significance from the historical and physical continuity between generations and
the implications of kinship.3 °0
The cases dealing with the right to choose to have an abortion indicate that
the state's interests have related primarily to protecting the fetus, as a potential
life, from the termination of that life without justification. 302 However, the courts
have held that the state's interest in protecting the child prior to viability is
minimal.0 3 Based on the lesser legal status of the embryo due to its biological
development, this reasoning supports noninterference by the government within
the privacy zones that encompasses embryological research.0 4
ii. Interests Related to the Moral Status of the Embryo
Some commentators, however, argue that the embryo has a greater legal
status than human organs because of the embryo's life potentiality.30 5 Thus,
society has created duties that demonstrate a commitment to human life, such as
protecting and showing respect toward embryos because they represent human
life, which reflect society's moral sentiments. 306 Others raise concerns during fetal
tissue experimentation discussions that implicate a state interest in preventing the
degradation of the reproductive process.30 7 The argue that restrictions on
embryological research upholds the value of life by respecting the embryo as a
symbol of life.30 8 By allowing embryological research, the government would be
condoning the degradation of life. This would lead to disrespect for actual life
through individual action. If the courts recognize this interest in the symbolic
representation of life, that interest must be balanced against the privacy interest
encompassed by embryological research to determine whether the state's interest
outweighs the parents' interest. 309 While the protection of symbols may be a
300. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871; Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
301. Lagod & Martin, supra note 8,at 287. But see Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1327-28
(suggesting that once the embryo is donated to the researcher, the state's interests become "compelling" as
compared to the minimal interests of the researcher).
302. Hemphill, supra note 107, at 378.
303. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
304. Robertson, supra note 8, at 974; see David T. Ozar, The Case Against Thawing Unused Frozen
Embyos, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7, 8 (1985) (noting that the state cannot have a compelling interest in an
embryo which is not to be implanted based on the potential for life using the Roe v. Wade viability standard).
305. Ozar, supra note 304, at 10-12; Robertson, supra note 8, at 975.
306. Legal Status, supra note 83, at 362; Ozar, supra note 304, at 10-12; Robertson, supra note 8, at 975.
307. Danis, supra note 26, at 1104-05.
308. Robertson, supra note 8, at 982.
309. Id. at 975.
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legitimate state interest, it does not rise to the compelling nature necessary to
intrude upon a zone of privacy.
In essence, such a position would protect the symbol to the detriment of
potential life and of actual life, based on the beneficial nature of medical
research.310 Furthermore, there is no evidence that the negative treatment of a
symbol affects the actions of individuals.311 Likewise, if such connection were
found, the disparity between the physical appearance of an embryo, a mass of
undifferentiated cells, and an actual person would not foster the feared association
suggested.312
The Supreme Court has frowned on arguments that promote intrusion on
constitutional rights based on the public's moral sentiment, such as that expressed
for a symbol.313 Thus, while protecting embryos, which might develop into
children, would be constitutionally permissible for the purposes of promoting a
compelling interest such as public health, state bans that are enacted to promote
morality would be impermissible. This issue becomes pertinent in determining
whether the legislation is narrowly tailored to address health concerns, as opposed
to complete prohibitions, which appear to be regulating morality.
Even if public sentiment leans toward respecting the embryo as a symbol of
potential life, embryo donation for research purposes would not denigrate the
embryo as a symbol of respect for life. Gifts have been shown, through anthro-
pological studies, to play an important role in the initiation and maintenance of
personal relationships.3 4 The gift of an embryo for research would satisfy the
need to establish a connection with society.315 Thus, the donation of an embryo,
the symbol of our society's respect for life, for research would actually be the
utmost gesture of a person's respect for life.316
310. Feinberg, supra note 92, at 31; see id. (recognizing the importance of respecting symbols of the
values which are sacred to society, but also recognizing the importance of not respecting the symbols too much
such that the values which they represent are overshadowed by feelings of sentimentality and squeamishness).
311. Id. at37.
312. Legal Status, supra note 83, at 363-64. However, there is a difference between physical recognition
which establishes a connection between a person and another item, and respecting the symbolic nature of an
embryo which represents future generations.
313. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l., 431 U.S. 678, 701 (1977); see id. (noting that "the fact that
protected speech may be offensive to some does not justify its suppression"). See generally John C. Fanta,
Legal Issues Raised by In Vitro Fertilization and Embryo Transfer in the United States, 2 J. IN VITRO
FERTILIZATION & EMBRYO TRANSFER 65, 72 (1985) (arguing that "[e]ven if a majority of the public found [in
vitro fertilization and embryo transfer] morally offensive, it would be done privately and out of the public eye;
(therefore, c]learly, the offense to public morality would not be sufficiently pervasive or extensive to justify
a complete ban of the procedure").
314. RICHARD M. TSTMUSS, THE GiFr RELATIONSHIP: FROM HUMAN BLOOD TO SOCIAL POLICY 72-73
(1971). Of course, this assumes that prohibitions regarding commercialization are in place such that a donee
could only receive reimbursement of expenses, at most.
315. See supra notes 277-81 and accompanying text (discussing the importance of organ donations to
society).
316. Hartman, supra note 279, at 538; see id. (noting that gifts of the body are essential to a large society
in order for its citizen's to mature and flourish as individuals).
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iii. Morality as an Interest
Many states express concern over the legal status of a fetus by enacting laws
that are broad enough to encompass embryos and also appear to be regulating
morality.31 7 Because of this morality aspect, the contraception line of right to
privacy cases that address the human dignity of reproduction and morality, may
be relevant.1 8 For instance, the Catholic belief that obstructing fertilization is
morally reprehensible, because contraception separates procreation from the
sexual act, can be applied to embryological research since the research would
separate the embryo from any chance at becoming a life, according to the guide-
lines proposed.319 The contraception line of right to privacy cases also seem to
implicate state interests in public morality and health issues?20 However, the
courts have found that a person's right to use contraception is so fundamental that
it "must be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion.' ' 32 The Supreme
Court has refused to recognize a state interest in regulating the morality of its
citizens as "compelling. ' '322 Therefore, the contraception line of cases indicate that
state interests implicated in banning embryological research that seek to regulate
morality would not withstand a right to privacy challenge. Health concerns that
317. See supra notes 118-93 and accompanying text (discussing the various state laws which could be
broadly interpreted to cover procedures which use embryos and the history of such legislation).
318. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 694-95 (1977) (rejecting New York's
argument that the state's interest in preventing increased sexual activity among minors was compelling);
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972) (noting that Massachusetts argued that the statute, which banned
the distribution of contraceptives unless distributed by a physician or pharmacist to a married person, was
intended to promote the health of its citizens and protect morals by regulating the "private sexual lives of single
persons" (citing Sturgis v. Attorney Gen., 260 N.E.2d 687, 690 (Mass. 1970))); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479, 499 (1965) (Goldberg, L, concurring) (stating that Connecticut only asserted the interest in
discouraging extramarital affairs as the compelling interest in banning the use of certain contraceptive methods
by married persons).
319. RICHARD MCCORMICK, How BRAVE A NEw WORLD 311-13 (1981); see Cahill, supra note 80, at
342 (quoting Comm. ON DOCrRINE OFTHE NAT'L CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL & RELIGIOUS
DIRECTIVES FOR CATHOLIC HEALTH FACILITIES directive 21 (1971). reprinted in 39 LINACRE Q. 8, 11 (1972))
(describing the Catholic objection to interference with procreation as upsetting the natural law "because the
ultimate expression of ... love in the marital act is... the only fitting context for the human sharing of the
divine act").
320. See supra note 318 and accompanying text (listing contraception cases which make note of state
interests related to morality and health concerns).
321. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453. The Supreme Court first held that contraceptive use by married couples
was a matter involving the marital relationship and restricting contraceptive use would "have a maximum
destructive impact upon that relationship." Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485. Eisenstadt expanded that notion to
unmarried couples. Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453.
322. Carey, 431 U.S. at 694; see Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448 (noting that "[i]t would be plainly
unreasonable to assume that [government] has prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as
punishment for fornication" (quoted in Carey, 431 U.S. at 695)); Brown, supra note 36, at 206 n.181
(indicating that it would also be "plainly unreasonable to assume that [government would prescribe] the
physical and psychological dangers of an abortion ... as punishment for fornication" (altering the quote from
Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 448)).
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are implicated in the contraception cases are not implicated in embryological
research bans since there are health risks associated with contraceptive products
that are not present in embryological research using spare, "dead" embryos.
b. Parental Interests
In the abortion line of cases, the mother's interests included autonomy over
her own body and the right to make reproductive choices.323 The substantiality of
these interests was determined by looking at the stigma of unwed motherhood,
the psychological harm to the mother related to having an unwanted child, the
quality of life with unwanted additional children, and the mental impact of caring
for children. 24 The Supreme Court based its analysis on the assumption that the
mother would raise the child if required to carry the child to term? 25 After
weighing these interests, the Supreme Court has held that until the fetus reaches
viability, a state's interests do not sufficiently outweigh the mother's interest in
reproductive freedom to justify supporting a complete ban on abortions.?
26
i. Psychological and Mental Impact
The parents' interests in permitting embryological research, or one of the five
other procedures that are banned by state laws must be examined to determine if
they outweigh a state's interest in banning these procedures. 27 In analyzing the
parents' interests implicated in embryological research, many of the factors dis-
cussed by the courts have little relevance. For instance, the physical impact of an
unwanted pregnancy on the mother is not an issue, thereby lessening the interests
of the gamete providers. While the stigma of unwed childbirth does not affect the
analysis, psychological and mental impacts may still be significant factors. For
instance, in Davis II, the Tennessee Supreme Court recognized the burdens
inherent in parenthood from the viewpoint of a noncustodial parent, weighing this
burden against the state's interest in an embryo's potential for life.328 The parents
may look to research that uses the spare embryos as a way of showing respect for
323. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 871 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113, 163 (1973).
324. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
325. The Court only analyzed the impact of forcing the mother to carry the child to term under the
condition that she raise the child herself, without addressing the possible implications of the mother putting
the child up for adoption.
326. Casey, 505 U.S. at 871-74; Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
327. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; Roe, 410 U.S. at 154.
328. Davis II, 842 S.W.2d 588, 602 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub nom. Stowe v. Davis, 567 U.S. 911
(1993); see Davis 1, No. E-14496, 1989 Tenn. App. LEXIS 641, *2 (Tenn. Cir. Ct. Sept. 21, 1989) (raising
questions regarding support, visitation, and custody of any children produced through in vitro fertilization
when one parent does not desire to implant the excess embryos, but declining to address these issues until an
actual case was tried).
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life. This choice appears better than donating the embryos to another person
because of concerns regarding the psychological burden of the parents knowing
their genetic child will exist without knowing them. 329 In vitro fertilization neces-
sarily produces spare embryos to limit health risks to the woman.33 Thus, in vitro
fertilization parents are left with a dilemma regarding the disposition of these
spare embryos that may impact their ultimate decision to procreate?3' Several
options are available-destroying the spare embryos; donating the spare embryos
to another woman, possibly under a mandatory donation law; 332 or permitting the
embryos to be used in research projects. Some parents may not choose to
procreate through in vitro fertilization-possibly the only avenue open to them-
because of governmental interference in their decisional authority?
331
Another issue not specifically addressed by the Court is the emotional impact
on the parents if the lack of reproductive choices forced the parents to put the
unwanted child up for adoption. Arguably, the Court's lack of consideration of
the more severe psychological impact of adoption, implies that the Court
recognizes the emotional impact of giving birth to a child whom the parents
cannot raise and who must be raised by strangers, somewhere in the world?
34
Adoption should be rejected as an option because creating a child whom the
parents will not know causes a heavy emotional burden on the parents.
3 35
Mandatory embryo donation raises the same concerns and could be analogous to
forced adoption, with its detrimental psychological impact. 36 If the government
requires a ban on embryological research as a means of showing respect for
embryos as symbols of life, discarding spare embryos would be a similarly
disrespectful act. As such, the only option left for the spare embryos is mandatory
donation to another parent-in effect forcing adoption. Thus, the emotional
impact of mandatory donation makes this option not feasible.
329. Davis II, 842 S.W.2d at 603-04.
330. See supra notes 29-38 and accompanying text (describing the egg retrieval process which results
in spare embryos).
331. Brown, supra note 36, at 236-37.
332. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:122 (West 1991) (limiting the creation of an embryo ex utero
solely for the purpose of a completed pregnancy); id. § 9:129 (West 1991) (prohibiting the destruction of
embryos).
333. Brown, supra note 36, at 230 n.347.
334. Hemphill, supra note 107, at 368.
335. Id. at 368 n. 59; see id. (noting that studies indicate that parents suffer great psychological injury
after relinquishing the child).
336. Id. at 374. The psychological trauma implicated by adoption includes feelings of "loss, pain.
mourning and a continuing sense of caring for that long vanished child." A. SOROSKY & R. PANNOR, THE
ADOPTION TRIANGLE 72 (1978).
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ii. Impact on Reproductive Decisions
Many parents might feel uneasy being involved in a process that creates the
potential for life merely to have the excess embryos destroyed without being used
for a higher purpose. These parents may value life and the symbolic nature of the
embryo too much to have the eggs merely destroyed. Thus, denying these parents
an option that respects the embryo as a symbol of life, such as donation for
embryological research, would seriously affect and limit their reproductive
choices.
Through beneficial research that has the potential of enriching society,
women may choose to participate in alternative reproductive methods, like in
vitro fertilization, by donating eggs without raising society's concerns regarding
the degradation of the value of life. Additionally, the Supreme Court should give
great weight to the right to control one's own genetic material, at least to the
extent of permitting embryos that will not be implanted to be used in research to
benefit humankind.337 Furthermore, a ban on embryological research may affect
reproductive decisions because undiscovered new technologies will never be
developed which would better alternative reproductive methods. Because a
states's interests are slight while the embryo is not viable, those interests do not
override the parental interests, and as bans would such, unduly burden
reproductive decision-making 38 Banning embryological research is therefore
unconstitutional.
iii. Parental Interests Outside of the Reproductive
Decision
Based on lower court decisions and state statutes, some commentators have
suggested that fundamental reproductive rights only override a state's interests
when the right to procreate and the right to abort is exercised, precluding the
parents' right to donate embryos to research.3 9 Outside the procreation and
abortion choices, a state's interests in protecting the unborn overrides the parents'
interests.3 40 However, these instances cannot be distinguished because the state
337. Hemphill, supra note 107, at 374.
338. Norton, supra note 34, at 1627-29. Case law has held that statutes that prescribe certain methods
of disposing of fetus' are overly burdensome of the right to reproductive freedom because the statutes
psychologically penalize a woman for exercising the right to choose to abort. Margaret S. 1 488 F.Supp. 181,
221-23 (E.D. La. 1980); see id. (stating that a Louisiana statute was unconstitutional because of the
psychological impact on the woman).
339. Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1327-28.
340. Statutes protecting the unborn from child abuse and lower court cases add credence to this position.
CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1995); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d 898, 899-900 (1985); see CAL.
PENAL CODE § 270 (West Supp. 1995) (defining an "existing person" to include a child conceived but not yet
born for purposes of establishing certain rights); In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900 (ordering a
blood transfusion for a pregnant woman, against her will, to benefit the non-viable fetus); Dawn E. Johnsen,
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may only afford protection to the fetus to the detriment of the parents' interests
past the point of viability or if intended to be carried to term.34' For example,
courts refuse to grant damages for wrongful death of a fetus if the fetus is
miscarried prior to viability.?42 Thus, the rationale that the compelling nature of
a state's interests outweighs other interests once a researcher is involved should
not be an impediment to embryological research.
c. Balancing the Interests
i. Reproductive Choices
The courts should find that laws completely prohibiting procedures that use
embryos to gather information for the purpose of making reproductive choices or
promoting procreation are unconstitutional. 3 The state interests do not outweigh
the parents' interests due to a close link to procreative freedom. 344 This protection
should extend to preimplantation genetic screening, twinning, and in some
respects cryopreservation.3 45 The lack of viability should be a key indicator that
the privacy interests of the parents override the state interest in protecting life.Y
6
Additionally, cryopreservation can encompass protecting the mother's life while
promoting procreation,2 a further indication that complete bans would be found
unconstitutional due to the overriding maternal interests.
Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and
Equal Protection, 95 YALE LJ. 599, 604-05, 609-10 (1986) (noting the expansion of California criminal child
abuse laws to encompass the unborn fetus).
341. E.g., In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900; Nicholas P. Terry. "Alas! Poor Yorick," I
Knew Him Ex Utero: The Regulation of Embryo and Fetal Experimentation and Disposal in England and the
United States, 39 VAND. L. REV. 419, 453 (1986); see In re Jamaica Hosp., 491 N.Y.S.2d at 899-900
(mandating that an 18 week pregnant mother receive a blood transfusion necessary to save her fetus when the
mother's religious beliefs would not allow the transfusion and the mother intended to carry the fetus to term).
342. E.g., Estate of Baby Foy by Foy v. Morningstar Beach Resort, Inc., 635 F. Supp. 741,744 (D.V.I.
1986); see Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 301-02 (Mich. 1975) (refusing to be the first court to grant
damages for the death of a nonviable fetus). But see Del Zio v. Presbyterian Hospital, No. 74 Civ. 3588
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 14, 1978) (LEXIS, Ny library, Nymega File), reprinted in 2 BiOErtiCS REP. 7, 14-15 (1985)
(awarding damages for the intentional destruction of a fertilized embryo).
343. Robertson, supra note 8, at 982; Norton, supra note 34, at 1628.
344. Robertson, supra note 8, at 982; Norton, supra note 34, at 1628.
345. Robertson, supra note 8, at 982.
346. Schaeffer, supra note 2, at 107.
347. Brody, supra note 31, at 153; see id. (explaining that the long term effects of hyperstimulation and
multiple egg retrievals are unknown); see supra note 32 and accompanying text (discussing the need for
producing excess embryos due to health concerns, in vitro fertilization success rates and expense).
Additionally, in vitro fertilization is the most stressful non-coital reproduction procedure, both emotionally and
financially. Brody, supra note 31, at 153.
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ii. Public Health
However, concerns regarding decreasing the gene pool so that genetic
diversity is curtailed can easily be characterized as a legitimate state interest in
public health-typically a compelling interest.348 If genes were screened such that
certain genes were not reproduced and the gene pool diminished, the resulting
gene pool may not be adaptable to our changing environment.349 Additionally, the
state interest in preventing the screening of embryos with certain genes that may
be linked to beneficial genes, like the link between Sickle Cell anemia and
malaria, are similarly compelling.3 50
The compelling state interest appears to override the parents' interest when
nontherapeutic genetic screening is done, such as screening for certain sex or hair
color traits. 35 ' The compelling state interest in public health is reduced when
compared to the gamete provider's interest in using information gained through
therapeutic genetic screening to aid in a decision to have a healthy baby or bear
an afflicted child.352 The balancing would necessarily include the emotional,
physical, and financial hardships that accompany the birth of a genetically
defective child.3 53 Thus, the state may constitutionally ban nontherapeutic genetic
screening, as opposed to therapeutic genetic screening, and not violate the gamete
providers' right of privacy in the form of reproductive freedom. However, courts
may not recognize the distinction since they have not made a distinction in an
analogous situation, i.e. between the fertile and the infertile with respect to the
right of access to contraceptives.3 54 If the distinction between therapeutic and
nontherapeutic genetic screening is not recognized, state laws could not
constitutionally restrict any kind of prenatal diagnosis without being declared
unconstitutional because of the impact such restrictions would have on
procreative freedom.355
State laws which completely ban gene therapy should be held uncon-
stitutional by the courts because gene therapy actually benefits the embryo by
improving the health of the embryo. The compelling state interests in respecting
348. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113. 154 (1973); see id. (recognizing that the state has a compelling interest
in protecting the public's health, including the health of an unborn child); Superintendent of Belchertown State
School v. Saikewicz, 370 N.E.2d 417, 425 (Mass. 1977) (recognizing that the state has a compelling interest
in the preservation of life and the protection of innocent third parties); Norton, supra note 34, at 1613, 1642-44
(noting that a decrease in the gene pool may lead to an inability for the human race to adapt to a changing
environment).
349. Norton, supra note 34, at 1613, 1642-44.
350. Id. at 1613; see id. (explaining that selections could result in an increase to disease or defects).
351. Id. at 1641-42; see id. at 1641-42 (discussing the impact bans on nontherapeutic preimplantation
genetic screening would have on the gamete provider's decision to procreate).
352. Id. at 1625.
353. Id.
354. Id. at 1627.
355. Id. at 1627-28.
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life and protecting the embryo would not outweigh the parents' interest in the
health of the child. While the state's interest in curtailing the tampering with life
may be characterized as a compelling public health interest, the individual child's
interest in personal health should override the state's interest.
Governmental interests based on a tremendous societal need for organs and
public recognition of the importance of health regulations to protect health and
safety add more strength to the invalidity of the research bans. 56 There is an
inconsistency between legislation banning embryological research in order to
protect society and legislation that encourages organ donation in order to protect
society. Embryological research benefits and protects society.3 7 By permitting
embryological research, the field of medicine can advance, saving people from
genetic defects and disease, as well as increasing reproduction through more
effective procedures.358 This will promote public health and safety policies and
regulations, such as prolonging life, easing discomfort, and preventing disease
and injury. Also, organ donation is considered a necessity by the public and both
organ and embryo donation are allowed under law.359 Therefore, embryo donation
for the specific purpose of research should be permitted as well.
iii. Donation for Research Purposes
Even without permitting embryo donation for reproduction purposes, the
similarities between organ donation and embryo donation for research purposes
necessitate similar results. While an organ is a portion of a body and the embryo
is the entire entity as it exists presently, both require "implantation" for enhancing
or "creating" life. Thus, banning embryological research would indicate an
356. See Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128-29 (Ga. 1985) (holding that the
state may override the common law quasi-property right by enacting mandatory organ donation laws based on
a tremendous need for organs and the society's need for health regulations if the regulation is reasonable and
impartial), cert. denied sub nom. Layant v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 475 U.S. 1087 (1986); infra note 359 and
accompanying text (listing a sampling of various state laws which recognize and promote organ donations),
357. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (suggesting many ways in which embryological
research could benefit mankind).
358. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text (proposing various areas in which the medical field can
utilize embryos to save people).
359. Hemphill, supra note 107, at 374; see, e.g. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §2701 (1995) (allowing the
donation of dead bodies for research purposes); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:133 (1991) (referring to permissible
embryo donations); id. § 32:410(A), (B) (West Supp. 1995) (discussing programs to encourage organ
donation); id. § 32:410(B)(b)(I) (West Supp. 1995) (permitting organ donation for research purposes); ME,
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 22 § 2903(1) (West 1992) (permitting donations for research purpose); id. tit. 29-A, §
1402(A)(1), (2) (West Supp. 1995) (allowing drivers to declare anatomical gifts to various entities, including
research institutions); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 113, § I (Law. Co-op. 1996) (providing that various institutes
may claim deceased bodies which are to be buried at public expense for research purposes); id. § 10(a)-(e)
(Law. Co-op. 1996) (permitting individuals to donate organs or parts of bodies); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §
333.10102a (West 1992) (discussing requirements for organ donation); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3213(e)
(1983 & Supp. 1995) (establishing reporting requirements for cryopreserved embryos which are to be donated).
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inconsistency between the state's interest implicated with an embryo and the
state's interest implicated with a viable, existing person with full fledged rights.
This inconsistency demonstrates that the state's interests, while compelling, are
weakened since there should be a greater interest in a viable, existing person than
in an embryo which is for all purposes dead. This lesser interest does not
outweigh the gamete providers' interests, thereby showing that the courts should
declare that total bans on embryological research are unconstitutional.
iv. Disposal of the Deceased
If the state's concerns are related to the disposal of the dead with dignity, the
courts have recognized state interests that could permissibly intrude into the zone
of privacy. States may regulate, or intrude upon, this right to remedy perceived
defects or accommodate changing circumstances, typically with respect to the
health and decency of the community2 60 Case law indicates that the state's
interest in protecting the public heilth from contagions or contaminated water
supplies, or even offensive sights, are sufficient to override the next-of-kin's
quasi-property right in the decedent's body.
36
Disposal of embryos through embryological research does not subject the
public to offensive sights similar to carrying a body in the back of a car, as the
defendant did in the Tennessee case of State v. Vestal.362 In fact, embryological
research is carried out privately and is not open to the public's viewing. Nor does
it subject the public to health risks, similar to the health risks of exposure to
contaminants or contagions when a corpse is disposed of improperly and the pub-
lic water supply is effected.363 While it does subject the public to risks of research
misuse, these fears can be addressed through limiting improper uses, not through
absolute bans. Thus, those state interests which have permitted regulation of
corpse disposal are not present in the embryological research context.
Therefore, based on case law, various state interests which run the gamut
from morality to preservation of life to public health and safety do not override
the parents' interest in personal freedom. Primarily, the crux of the problem is
360. Leigh v. Olson, 497 F. Supp. 1340, 1351 (D.N.D. 1980); Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Fitzpatrick,
401 F. Supp. 554, 573 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd sub nom. Franklin v. Fitzpatrick, 428 U.S. 901 (1976);Georgia
Lions Eye Bank, Inc., 335 S.E. 2d at 128-29; see id. at 128-29 (holding that the state may override the common
law quasi-property right by enacting mandatory organ donation laws based on a tremendous need for organs
and the society's need for health regulations if the regulation is reasonable and impartial). There is a definite
difference between the analysis of regulations compelling organ donation and regulation permitting organ
donation, namely the interest in procuring organs versus the interest in abusing the ability to create life and the
symbol of respect for life. Danis, supra note 26, at 1102-03.
361. State v. Vestal, 611 S.W.2d 819, 821-22 (Tenn. 1981).
362. Id.; see State v. Robinson, 274 N.W.2d 553, 554 (Neb. 1979) (upholding a guilty verdict for the
offensive act of placing the deceased in the back of a car and driving it off the road into a ditch).
363. Vestal, 611 S.W.2d at 821-22; see id. (proposing that increased health risks from contamination or
contagions would provide a sufficient state interest to override the next-of-kins' interest).
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that the state's interests are minimal, albeit legitimate, if the spare embryo has no
potential for life. This aspect, combined with the fact that total bans on pro-
cedures that use embryos unduly burden the parents' reproductive freedom, leads
to the conclusion that complete bans on embryological research or experi-
mentation are unconstitutional. The only time the state interest rises above the
parents' interests is in the case of nontherapeutic genetic screening because of the
gravity of harm that may occur since it is difficult to predict the dangers of
genetic screening.
3. Restricting Research Without Absolute Bans
If total embryological research bans are found unconstitutional, the states may
constitutionally regulate research in a limited manner. Abortion cases provide
clear examples of regulations that are constitutional because they are not overly
burdensome on the right to privacy.364 In Planned Parnthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey,36 the Supreme Court adopted an "undue burden" standard
for determining the constitutional viability of abortion regulations? 66 This test
conforms with earlier Supreme Court decisions holding that "unreasonable or
arbitrary" attempts to limit a fundamental right or subtly control the right as a
means of discouraging conduct are unconstitutionally burdensome? 67
364. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877-78 (1992) (distinguishing
between permissible and impermissible abortion regulations).
Regulations which do no more than create a structural mechanism by which the State, or the parent
or guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the life of the unborn are permitted, if
they are not a substantial obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose .... Unless it has
that effect on her right of choice, a state measure designed to persuade her to choose childbirth over
abortion will be upheld if reasonably related to that goal. Regulations designed to foster the health
of a woman seeking an abortion are valid if they do not constitute an undue burden.
Id.; see also Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 79-81 (1976) (upholding the
constitutionality of a state law mandating special records be kept as long as anonymity of the mother is
protected); id. at 65-66 (confirming that written consent from a woman is not overly burdensome of the right
to choose not to bear a child); Connecticut v. Menillo, 423 U.S. 9 (1975) (validating a state requirement that
abortions shall be performed by licensed physicians). But see Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians
and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1986) (holding that statregulations prescribing coercive consent
forms or procedures are unconstitutional); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462
U.S. 416, 434-35 (1983) (holding that state laws which increase the cost of the abortion procedure are
unconstitutional due to the excessive burden increased costs place on a woman's right to an abortion); West
Side Women's Serv., Inc. v. Cleveland, Ohio, 573 F. Supp. 504, 524 (N.D. Ohio 1983) (invalidating a state
regulation which limited the location of abortion clinics).
365. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
366. Casey, 505 U.S. at 877; see id. (defining the "undue burden standard" to invalidate abortion
regulation if its purpose or effect is to place a substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion
before the fetus attains viability).
367. Thornburgh. 476 U.S. at 763-64; Danforth, 428 U.S. at 79; Planned Parenthood Ass'n of
Cincinnati, Inc. v. City of Cincinnati, 635 F. Supp. 469,471 (S.D. Ohio 1986), affd., 822 F.2d 1390 (6th Cir.
1987). But see Margaret S. 1I, 794 F.2d 999, 998 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986) (indicating that a statue designed to
remove the incentives for researchers to promote abortions or to manipulate timings of abortions for the
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The Supreme Court has afforded great weight to American Medical
Association Guidelines in determining whether a regulation is unreasonable.36
As such, the American Fertility Society's and the American College of Obstetrics
and Gynecology's guidelines regarding medical facility and personnel criteria for
conducting in vitro fertilization might lead to a court validation of similar state
requirements.369
The states may have a compelling interest to regulate very limited, specific
kinds of research as well. When the compelling nature of the states interests rises,
regulating specific kinds of research appears warranted.370 For instance, banning
research that results in implantation after manipulation would appear to be
constitutional since it raises questions of prenatal rights of offspring with a greater
potential for life.37' Also, prohibitions on recombinant human DNA research372
used to introduce genes from other species or genes created in a laboratory into
a human would appear to be constitutional because of public health concerns
related to the fear of misapplying the technology.373 As the NIH panel proposes,
promotes, commercialization and exploitation of women and embryos would be
an appropriate matter for state regulation because such legislation would not
unduly burden reproductive decisions and it addresses legitimate governmental
concerns.
374
While many state-imposed burdens have been invalidated, the Supreme Court
has held that the Constitution does not protect against burdens that are not state-
purpose of supplying fetal tissue for experimentation is rationally related to an important state interest).
368. City ofAkron, 462 U.S. at 436-37; see id (reviewing the recommendations of the American Public
Health Association and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists that certain second trimester
abortions could be performed in outpatient facilities to determine that the state's requirements that second
trimester abortions required hospitalization was unconstitutionally burdensome).
369. COMMIrrEE ON ETHICs, ETHICAL ISSuEs IN HUMAN IN VITRO FERTILIZATION AND EMBRYO
PLACEMENT, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS AND GYNECOLOGY, AMERICAN COLLEGE OF OBSTETRICS
AND GYNECOLOGY COMM'ITEE OPINION (1986); American Fertility Society, Revised Minimum Standards for
In Vitro Fertilization, Gamete Intrafallopian Transfer, and Related Procedures, 53 FERTILITY & STERILrrY
225, 225-26 (1990); see id. (recommending that all programs participate in the United States In Vitro
Fertilization Registry or make available current statistics regarding the use and success of procedures, and
recommending full disclosure to prospective patients of the program's own statistics); Dickey, supra note 1,
at 328-30 (noting that the American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology and the American Fertility Society
have guidelines regarding facility and personnel requirements for providing optimum in vitro fertilization
results).
370. Robertson, supra note 8, at 981-82. For instance, a state's interests may rise as the potential for life
increases. Cahill, supra note 80, at 348-354; see id. (discussing different religious views that hold that the
moral status of the conceptus increases as the potentiality for life increases).
371. Clapp, supra note 121, at 1096.
372. SLOANE SUPP., supra note 7, at 197 (defining "recombinant human DNA research" as artificially
introducing human DNA into a cell so that the cell's genetic and physical makeup is altered).
373. Clapp, supra note 121, at 1096.
374. See Danis, supra note 26, at 1104 (proposing that states may properly regulate fetal tissue
transplantation as relates to commercialization and exploitation of women and fetuses).
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created. 375 For example, the state may express its distaste for embryological
research by withholding public funding for research, much the same as a state
withholding public funding of abortions. 376 One hypothetical argument that a state
could propose is that the lack of scientific knowledge is not a state-imposed
burden.377 This theory could then provide a constitutional basis for banning
embryological research, since the right to privacy only governs state action.?
7
1
However, this argument is flawed.379 A state's refusal to fund abortions still
allows private arrangements for abortions, although effectively removing that
reproductive choice from the poor.380 However, a state's refusal to permit
embryological research terminates a source of information fundamental to the
reproductive decision. 8
C. Right to Research
Many commentators have suggested that the First Amendment protects the
right to gather knowledge through research.3 82 This is based on our nation's long
history of respect for freedom. History provides many examples of scientific
theories which, when proved correct, altered the moral fabric of society-such as
the theory of evolution and the discovery of the atom. 83 This history has taught
the Western world, and the United States in particular, the hazards of restricting
scientific inquiry-synonymous with the dangers of strict governmental control
in areas like speech. 84 As a result, the United States glorifies the sanctity of
375. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 917; Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S.
464.474 (1977).
376. Courts have noted that the right to make reproductive decisions does not translate into an affirmative
right which the government must fund. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474; see Harris, 448 U.S. at 324-26 (upholding a
state's value judgment to support childbirth, rather than abortions, through funding); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. I, 94 (1976) (noting that denying funding to Presidential candidates does not overly burden the right to
vote, because lack of funding is merely "denial of the enhancement of opportunity"); cf. Delgado & Millen,
supra note 261, at 389-90 (arguing that restricting government funding of scientific research would be
unconstitutional); id. at 398-99 (suggesting that discontinuing government funding because the research would
be "too dangerous or socially disruptive" could be unconstitutional based on a due process argument).
377. Clapp, supra note 121, at 1090.
378. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
379. Clapp, supra note 121, at 1090-92.
380. Id. at 1091.
381. Id.
382. See infra note 388 and accompanying text (providing a list of commentators who propose that
previous court decisions indicate there is a right to research implicit in the First Amendment's freedom of
speech).
383. See generally Ferguson, supra note 101, at 641 & n.7 (noting historical scientific advances which
society feared would conflict with its values as discussed in F.S. KUHN, THs STRUCTURS OF SCIENTIFIC
REVOLUTIONS 52-91 (1970)).
384. Id. at 641; see Francione, supra note 261, at 428-29 (discussing the sacred nature of scientific
inquiry which the framers of the Constitution desired to protect).
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knowledge and the value of intellectual freedom.385 The major tenet underlying
these theories is that the essence of humanity is an active mind, which is used for
a free exchange of ideas facilitated through the acquisition of knowledge.?
8 6
The First Amendment guarantees freedom of speech-the "full opportunity
for expression in all its varied forms to convey a desired message. ' 38 7 In order to
have the opportunity for meaningful expression in the marketplace of ideas, one
must have the freedom to pursue knowledge, including research. 388 Without such
protection, the government could restrict the free flow of information by
regulating its source.389 This would defeat a major premise of the First
Amendment: the protection from government interference. This protection
enables the public to gain information for public and private decision-making.
390
Various Supreme Court decisions, read together, seem to acknowledge a
freedom to conduct research which is anchored in the freedom of speech.39t The
Supreme Court has protected various stages of research: hypothesis develop-
385. Ferguson, supra note 101, at 641.
386. Id.
387. U.S. CONsT. amend. I; Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 76 (1976) (Powell,
J., concurring), reh'g denied, 429 U.S. 873.
388. Davidson, supra note 12, at 894-95; Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 372-88; Ferguson, supra
note 101, at 644; Eggen, supra note 31, at 653-57; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1216-18. But see
Stephen L. Carter, The Bellman, the Snark, and the Biohazard Debate, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 358, 369-73
(1985) (questioning whether the right to research is a right protected under the ruberik of the First
Amendment); Francione, supra note 261, at 430-59 (arguing that the theory that research is necessary to freely
participate in the marketplace of ideas does not provide a basis for First Amendment protection).
389. Francione, supra note 261, at 428-29; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1217.
390. Francione, supra note 261, at 428-29; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1216-18. See generally
Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 354-71 (discussing the historical and constitutional underpinnings of the
freedom of speech as relates to the freedom to conduct research).
391. Delgoda & Millen, supra note 261, at 372-88; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973)
(holding that the "First Amendment protects works which, taken as a whole, have ... scientific value,
regardless of whether the government or a majority of the people approve of the ideas these works represent");
Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1325 (quoting the National Commission for the Protection of Human
Subjects of Biomedical and Behavioral Research Report and Recommendations (HEW Publication No. (OS)
78-0003)); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) (noting that the Continental Congress cited
scientific advancement as a reason for protecting freedom of the press), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852; Sweezy
v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (noting that "[tleachers and students must always remain free
to inquire, to study and to evaluate, to gain new maturity and understanding; otherwise our civilization will
stagnate and die"), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852. In Sweezy's concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter explained:
For society's good-if understanding be an essential need of society-inquiries into these
problems, speculations about them, stimulations in others of reflection upon them, must be left as
unfettered as possible. Political power must abstain from intrusion into this activity of freedom,
pursued in the interest of wise government and the people's well being, except for reasons that are
exigent and obviously compelling.... Freedom to reason and freedom for disputation on the basis
of observation and experiment are the necessary conditions for the advancement of scientific
knowledge. f
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See generally Francione, supra note 261, at 419 n.2
(listing numerous articles which discuss the right to research).
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ment,3 2 information accumulation through experimentation, 393 dissemination of
findings,394 receipt of information and application of methods obtained from
others.395 In Branzburg v. Hayes,396 the Supreme Court specifically recognized
that "[t]he informative function asserted by representatives of the organized press
... is also performed by lecturers, political pollsters, novelists, academic
researchers, and dramatists., 397 Thus, the right to acquire information through
research from willing participants or from material under their control-such as
embryos that will not be implanted-can be extrapolated from the First
Amendment right to acquire information from willing sources. 398 However, while
each step of the research process appears to have received tangential Supreme
Court approval, state bans on embryological research only prohibit the use of
embryos in research. Thus, this discussion will center on the impermissibility of
banning this conduct--embryological research. Classifying the regulation as
392. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319,320 (1937).
393. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972); Zemel v.
Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965), reh'g denied, 382 U.S. 873; see Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 373-78
(extrapolating the protection of the right to accumulate information afforded journalists in the Branzburg case
to afford protection to scientific researchers as well); Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1226-29 (noting
there is a distinction between a right to gather information reserved to the press and one reserved to the public,
but concluding that both the press and the public have a constitutional right to gather information). See
generally id. at 1229-37 (discussing the differences which differentiate the news gathering cases between
willing and unwilling sources, as well as the difference between government and public sources). John
Robertson argues that the right to accumulate information can be gleaned from the Supreme Court cases which
recognize a right to receive information from willing sources. Id. at 1219-26; see, e.g., Linmark Assoc., Inc.
v. Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977) (home buyers right to acquire information from "for sale" signs regarding
home sales activity); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976) (right of consumers to receive pharmacists' advertising); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753
(1972) (scholars right to receive a lecture from a Marxist scholar); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969)
(right to receive information within the privacy of own home through the reading of obscene materials);
Lamont v. Postmaster General of U.S., 381 U.S. 301 (1965) (addressee's right to receive "communist political
propaganda" mailed from abroad); cf Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (denying a former
mental patient access to her hospital records in order to write a book about her experience because the
"speaker" was unwilling to impart the information), afT'd, 514 F.2d 125 (2d Cir. 1975); Right to Research,
supra, at 1225-26 (suggesting that courts have not protected the right to acquire information when the source
is unwilling to provide such information to the public).
394. Delgoda & Millen, supra note 261, at 385; Eggen, supra note 31, at 654.
395. Lamont, 381 U.S. at 308 (Brennan, J., concurring); Delgoda & Millen, supra note 261, at 372-88;
Eggen, supra note 31, at 653-57; see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (recognizing the right to
"acquire useful knowledge").
396. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
397. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 705 (emphasis added).
398. Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1223-24, 1237-40. But see Francione, supra note 261, at 430-
59 (arguing that research is not constitutionally protected by the First Amendment because it does not qualify
as "expressive"). See generally Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 349.
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affecting "conduct," as opposed to speech, does not take it outside the realm of
First Amendment Protection.
399
John Robertson, 400 a leading legal scholar in the area of reproductive tech-
nologies, expresses a simpler theory to evaluate the constitutionality of state pro-
hibitions on embryological research. This theory focuses on the constitutionality
of banning the publishing of research results.4°1 Robertson argues that because
publishing results is protected under the First Amendment, conducting the
research, a necessary precursor to publication, would be protected as well.' The
Supreme Court has included many precursors to speech in the broad protection
of the First Amendment.4 3 In Buckley v. Valeo 4°4 and First National Bank of
Boston v. Bellotti,405 the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to
the financing of speech because it is a precursor to speech in the political realm. 4°6
Earlier, in Sweezy v. New Hampshire,407 the Court found that the First Amend-
ment protected not only teachers' and students' speech, but also the precursors to
that speech-gaining new maturity and understanding through inquiry, study, and
evaluation.408 More clearly on point, Branzburg recognized a First Amendment
protection for the gathering of news, a precursor to reporting the news. 9
In each of these cases the resulting speech was fundamentally dependent on
the restricted activity, just as speech regarding embryology and other scientific
topics is fundamentally dependent on the development of that knowledge through
embryological research. This holding and the earlier ones should permit not only
the researcher's scientific inquiry and experimentation, but also the individual's
399. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900; see id. (upholding
convictions for draft card burning, a combination of "speech" and "nonspeech," because a compelling
governmental interest justified the incidental limitation on the freedom of speech). But see Francione, supra
note 261, at 431-42 (suggesting that the Supreme Court distinguished research as facilitating expressive
conduct from actual expressive conduct, which is protected by the First Amendment, in Clark v. Community
for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 296 (1984)).
400. John Robertson is a Professor of Law at the University of Texas School of Law. He received his
A.B. from Dartmouth College in 1964 and his J.D. from Harvard in 1968. Robertson, supra note 8, at 942.
401. Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1251-53. But see Francione, supra note 261, at 459-511
(proposing that the First Amendment does not protect the freedom to conduct research based on categorizing
research as a necessary precursor to speech because all conduct could be considered the precursor to some kind
of speech and any limitation would probably be viewed as promoting governmental ideas because of the
predominance of government funded experimentation).
402. Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1251-53.
403. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 787-93 (1978), reh'g denied, 438 U.S. 907;
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19 (1976); Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S.
234, 250 (1957), reh'g denied, 355 U.S. 852. But see Francione, supra note 261, at 462 (disputing whether the
Supreme Court recognizes First Amendment protection of many precursors to speech).
404. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
405. 435 U.S. 765 (1978).
406. First Nat'l Bank of Boston, 435 U.S. at 788-92; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 16.
407. 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
408. Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250.
409. Branzburg, 408 U.S. at 681-82.
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participation as a research subject-a precursor to the publication of scientific
findings.410 The relatively few cases that have determined the constitutionality of
state interference with research have recognized the right to research based on the
freedom of speech. 4n
The Supreme Court has accepted incidental infringement on the freedom of
speech based on a sufficiently compelling governmental interest.4t2 The Supreme
Court has recognized a variety of tests to be used to determine what label of
government interference is permissible.1 3 For instance, in United States v.
O'Brien,4 4 the Court held that burning a draft card was a course of conduct with
speech and nonspeech elements closely intertwined.4 5 Thus, the government
could restrict the nonspeech portion if the governmental interest in the prohibition
was sufficiently important to override the incidental nature of the freedom
infringement.41 6 This standard seems most appropriate in the embryological
research area since the speech and nonspeech facets are very intermingled. 1
7
When speech is regulated as a byproduct of regulating noncommunicative acts,
the regulation is constitutional as long as it does not unduly restrict the flow of
information and ideas.418 According to the Supreme Court, activities may be
410. Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1325; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1212. But see Carter,
supra note 388, at 373-77 (arguing that the "precursor" premise supporting the right to research is too tenuous).
411. Henley v. Wise, 303 F. Supp. 62 (N.D. Ind. 1969); see id. (upholding the right of academic
researchers in the Kinsey Institute at the University of Indiana to maintain and use obscene materials as part
of a research project); see also In re Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 495 F. Supp. 582, 586-88 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
(finding that a subpoena for background data, which resembled scholarly research, for a Consumer's Report
article could be quashed because of First Amendment implications); Trachtman v. Anker, 563 F.2d 512, 516
(2d Cir. 1977) (noting that a survey distributed by a student journalist which researched the sexual attitudes,
preferences, knowledge and experience of high school students implicated First Amendment protection), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 925 (1978). See generally Robert M. O'Neil, Scientific Research and the First Amendment:
An Academic Privilege, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 837 (1983) (discussing the ability to raise First Amendment
defenses to prevent subpoena information from being revealed); Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1240-46
(discussing the implications of recent court decisions on the right to research).
412. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,376 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900; Delgado & Millen,
supra note 261, at 376-77; see O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376 (holding that a sufficiently important governmental
interest can legitimize incidental intrusions on First Amendment freedoms when "speech" and "nonspeech"
elements are combined in the same conduct); see also Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 835 (1974) (upholding
regulations which banned the press from interviewing prison inmates because the state interests in security and
related administrative problems, along with the policy underlying the correctional system, outweighed the
slight infringement on the press' freedom of speech given the information was not available to the general
public); Eggen, supra note 31, at 654 n.113 (noting that scientific research is a hybrid of "speech" and
"nonspeech" elements, including pure speech, in the form of published writings, and conduct, in the form of
performing experiments).
413. Davidson, supra note 12, at 914-18; Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 390-91.
414. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
415. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376.
416. Id.
417. Davidson, supra note 12, at 915-18; Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 391.
418. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); LAWRENCETRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITIIONAL LAW
791-92 (2d ed. 1988); see Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 384 (discussing the limitations on the free flow
of information if scientific information is curtailed through prohibitions on research); Eggen, supra note 3 1,
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properly restricted if the legislation is based on a substantial government interest,
such as protecting the health or autonomy of subjects, or the safety of the com-
munity, as opposed to restricting undesirable ideas or knowledge sought. 19 A
balancing test is used to determine the legitimate nature of the state interest by
looking at the risk of harm occurring and the gravity of harm.420 An interest is
considered legitimate if it has a high probability of occurring or a corresponding
high degree of harm, or a balanced combination of both.4 2' Thus, regulation of
activities that are a precursor to speech would not be permissible solely to restrict
or prohibit the development of new knowledge."2 Furthermore, if the state has
a substantial interest, then the state must establish that the incidental restriction
on free expression is no greater than is necessary for the furtherance of the
interest!'2
Thus, when state concerns focus on limiting knowledge because of the fear
of improper use of the knowledge, such as using the information gained to make
abortion decisions or making choices regarding the characteristics of a child, state
prohibitions would be constitutionally barred because the state interest is not a
legitimate one.424 Additionally, basic research on embryos could be classified as
restricting or prohibiting the development of new knowledge if embryological
research was performed only when all other avenues were exhausted. Curtailing
the development of new knowledge is not a legitimate goal since the Court has
at 655 n.1 14 (noting that research associated with the advanced reproductive technologies would likely utilize
this analysis, as opposed to the "clear and present danger" standard).
419. First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 & n.23 (1978), reh'g denied, 438 U.S.
907; Elrod v. Bums, 427 U.S. 347, 362-63 (1976); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Davidson, supra note 12, at 901,
915-16; Ferguson, supra note 101, at 655-64; Flannery, supra note 123, at 1325-26; Right to Research, supra
note 261, at 1249-50, 1254.
420. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 843 (1978); Ferguson, supra note 101,
at 657-58.
421. Landmark Communications, Inc., 435 U.S. at 843; Ferguson, supra note 101, at 657-58.
422. Flannery et al., supra note 123, at 1325-26; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1249-50.
423. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377; Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1939); Delgoda & Millen,
supra note 261, at 377, 392; Ferguson, supra note 101, at 655-64; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1249-
51.
424. Ferguson, supra note 101, at 662-63; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1251; see Davidson,
supra note 12, at 915-16 (suggesting that the standard should be more stringently applied than it was in
O'Brien because research is the sole way of gathering data for a researcher's expression, as opposed to a
multitude of ways of expressing displeasure with the draft besides a public burning as committed in O'Brien);
see also O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377 (holding that Congress had a sufficiently important interest in prohibiting
destruction of draft cards since the cards served as proof of registration, facilitated information regarding the
registrant and carried reminders for the registrant). But see Keith Werhan, The O'Briening of Free Speech
Methodology, 19 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 635, 640-41 (1987) (arguing that the compelling component will always be
satisfied because "legislatures simply do not enact wholly useless provisions") (quoting Ely, Flag Desecration:
A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REV.
1482, 1486 (1975)).
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invalidated governmental control that would deal with "control of reason and
intellect," such as the reason and intellect involved in basic research!2
5
The first requirement in restricting speech is that the state have a substantial
justification. Legitimate state concerns would necessarily relate to health and
welfare, as opposed to society's collective conscience or morality.426 A state may
propose to promote the health and welfare of its citizenry by curtailing research
like embryological research due to a fear of the possible evils that could result
from such research, either because the procedures imperil public health and
welfare, or because the knowledge is in some sense dangerous or inopportune. In
such a case, the courts could give great deference to a state's fears, for although
the probability of harm is unknown, the gravity of harm could be extensive. 427 A
state may also fear that the knowledge gained or the procedure itself conflicts
with a central moral value.428
Also, a state may argue that prohibiting embryological research is not ban-
ning the development of new knowledge, but merely regulating the methodology
of research in general. After all, over the past decades, new knowledge has
developed without the use of embryological research in areas such as in vitro
fertilization.
States may also argue that alternatives to embryological research exist such
as computer simulation and animal experimentation. Further, because the pro-
posed criteria for permitting embryological research would only allow research
that is necessary because the information cannot be gained any other way, a state
argument implying that the restriction would be curtailing a method of gathering
information, and not the information itself, would be false. A direct need for the
research would be identified, which could be met with computer simulation or
animal experimentation.
The second requirement in a First Amendment constitutional analysis is that
the restriction be narrowly tailored so that the restriction is no greater than is
required to further the governmental interest.4 29 While state interests may be
found substantial by characterizing them as health and welfare-related issues,
regulations promoting those concerns could be less restrictive of speech while
still furthering the governmental interest.4 30 If the laws regulated adverse use,
425. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973).
426. Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975); Davidson, supra note 12, at 913,
n.150; Ferguson, supra note 101, at 663; see Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 (holding that the First Amendment
strictly limits the power of the government to act as a censor when it "undertakes selectively to shield the
public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others").
427. Ferguson, supra note 101, at 657-58.
428. Id. at 657.
429. Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); TRIBE, supra note 418, at 791-92.
430. Ferguson, supra note 101, at 663; Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1250; see Davidson, supra
note 12, at 915-16 (arguing that the least restrictive standard must be strictly enforced, as opposed to the lesser
enforcement exemplified in O'Brien due to the nature of research for a researcher-the sole avenue of gaining
information with which to express ideas); Ferguson, supra note 101, at 658 (presenting a similar counter
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rather than all embryological research, a state concern that new information
would be misused, such as a concern related to eugenics, could be addressed
while still permitting the development of new knowledge through embryological
research. State laws banning basic embryological research are clearly absolute,
and thus, should be classified as unduly burdensome of the freedom of speech.
The Supreme Court has recognized several areas in which state interests
outweigh the right to free speech.4 31 The Court held that the contents of these
areas of speech are of such slight social value, and did not even faintly resemble
an "expression of ideas," that the state interest in social order and morality out-
weighs the benefit of permitting such speech.432 For example, criminal sanctions
are permissible when the speech is used to incite "imminent lawless action.
433
The state may also regulate libel and pornography.43
None of these standards are applicable to embryological research, or general
research.435 First, published general research or embryological research could not
be classified as an incitement to unlawful behavior. 436 Second, even if a researcher
was held liable for incitement of unlawful conduct based on information
presented in an noninciteful manner, the state could not prove that there is a high
probability of grave harm in order to override the freedom of speech, a factor
necessary to prove incitement.4 37 Even if the "high probability of grave harm"
standard was met, the existence of alternative restrictions would bar total pro-
hibitions of embryological research.438 Primarily though, basic research, including
that which utilizes embryos, does not pose any real, imminent danger to society,
and thus any state interest does not outweigh the benefits of the freedom of
speech through the right to conduct research.439 Finally, unlike pornography,
argument for recombinant-DNA technology). But see Werhan, supra note 424, at 640-41 (proposing that the
Supreme Court has failed to strictly enforce this prong, preferring to look to whether the interest could be
achieved without the ban, thereby casting this prong as more of a rational basis test).
431. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (libel), cert. denied sub nom. Robert Welch,
Inc. v. Gertz, 459 U.S. 1226 (1983); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (incitement); Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957) (pornography).
432. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
433. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447; Davidson, supra note 12, at 914-15.
434. See, e.g., Gertz, 418 U.S. 323; Roth, 354 U.S. 476.
435. Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1250.
436. Id.
437. Id. at 1250-52. Robertson argues that research results would more likely meet this standard than
the conducting of research because research results are known and the reaction to the results can be evaluated
with greater certainty than research which is being conducted with substantial uncertainty as to the final
outcome. Id. at 1252.
438. Id. at 1250-52.
439. Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 380-81.
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embryological research has "serious literary, artistic or scientific value" because
it adds to the body of scientific knowledge known to humankind. 440
The states may wish to characterize embryological research bans as
limitations on the time, manner or place of the speech, as opposed to the means
by which that speech is delivered. If the courts characterized bans on embryo-
logical research as restricting the manner of research, such as research which
utilizes embryos, as opposed to the means, such as research which provides
unique knowledge, the restriction would have to relate to a valid state interest in
health, peace, order, safety or welfare, and must be narrowly tailored to address
only those concerns as affected by the speech."' However, these state interests
are not legitimate in light of the uncertainty of the dangers of embryological
research given that the nonimplanted embryo will never reach viability.42 The
alternatives available to protect against a state's concerns which would impede
the freedom of speech to a lesser degree, such as prohibiting implantation after
research on an embryo and banning cross-species gene therapy, provide further
impetus to invalidate total embryological research bans. Such alternatives would
address a state's concerns regarding abuse of embryological technology, yet still
permit embryological procedures.
Some commentators suggest that societal mores may be a sufficient state
interest to regulate the manner of research." 3 However, if embryological research
is recognized as a fundamental right, societal mores will not justify the infringe-
ment of that fundamental right.4"4 With the scientific value that embryological
research represents, state concerns based on societal mores would be insufficient
to justify restriction of the freedom of speech.445 Even if societal mores are
sufficient grounds, the lack of a societal consensus on the immorality of embryo-
logical research indicates that societal mores are a moot point until such con-
440. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49,67 (1973) (quoting language from Miller v. California,
413 U.S. 15, 24, 34 (1973)) (emphasis added); see id. (noting that obscene material, "by definition lacks any
serious literary, artistic, or scientific value," and thus falls outside of the protection of the First Amendment).
441. Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412-16 (1974); Paris Adult Theatre , 413 U.S. at 57-69;
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968), reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 900. Specifically, this test has been
used most often to determine the constitutionality of non-content related restrictions. Right to Research, supra
note 261, at 1253-55.
442. Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 380-81.
443. Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1254 n.233.
444. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973); see id. (holding that morality cannot justify the
repression of works having "serious literary, artistic, political, orscientific value") (emphasis added); see also
Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (holding that the First Amendment strictly limits the
power of the government to act as a censor when it "undertakes selectively to shield the public from some
kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive than others"); Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97,
107-09 (1968) (invalidating a state statute which imposed criminal liability on public school teachers who
taught Darwin's theory of evolution because moral objections could not constitutionally result in the
infringement of a constitutional right); Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 374 n.166 (discussing the
impropriety of using "ethical, philosophical, or religious orthodoxies" to violate free expression).
445. Delgado & Millen, supra note 261, at 385.
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sensus is reached. Additionally, Justice Brandeis argues that the First Amendment
is meant to protect the philosophies "which a vast majority of... citizens believes
to be false and fraught with evil consequence[s]." 4 6 The Supreme Court echoed
Justice Brandeis's viewpoint when it noted that "[a]ll ideas having even the
slightest redeeming social importance-unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion-have the full protection
of the [First Amendment] guarantees, unless excludable because they encroach
upon the limited area of more important interests."'
A further consideration that may influence the courts is the impact such bans
may have.448 There is some indication that bans may impact the development of
diagnostic procedures and the treatment of genetic diseases or defects. 4 9 If
embryological research was prohibited everywhere, in vitro fertilization would
never have come to fruition. A similar fate could be predicted for all embryo-
logical procedures without embryological research being conducted somewhere.
This may cause the courts to lean toward striking down bans on embryological
research as unduly burdensome of the freedom of speech.450
D. Rational Basis
If the courts find that there is no fundamental right under the First or
Fourteenth Amendments implicated in embryological research, the regulation
must rationally relate to a legitimate state interest. Thus, embryological
research bans may be regulated to advance legitimate state interests, but such
regulations cannot be arbitrarily burdensome.452 While most of the state concerns
seem to center on the status of the embryo as a person and protecting it due to its
potential for life, that interest is not easily related to a prohibition on research.
Because the embryo donator does not wish to implant the embryo and mandatory
donation laws have been criticized as unconstitutional, the embryo is, for all
446. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357,374 (1927) (concurring opinion in which Holmes, J., joined).
447. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,484 (1957).
448. Ferguson, supra note 101, at 664.
449. Id. (quoting Batelle-Columbus Laboratories, An Assessment of the Role of Research Involving
LUving Human Fetuses in Advances in Medical Science and Technology, reprinted in NATIONAL COMMISSION
FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN SUBJECTS OF BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, RESEARCH ON THE
FETUS 15-1 app. (1975)).
450. Ferguson, supra note 101, at 664.
451. Louis Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1410, 1426 (1974); Right to Research,
supra note 261, at 1254; see Henkin, supra (noting that when a fundamental right is not implicated, the right
is still subject to the police power of state governments and all the implications thereof, like statutory validity
presumption, a very heavy burden of proof to show that a regulation has no conceivable purpose or that the
ends are not rationally related to the means).
452. Margaret S. III, 597 F. Supp. 636, 675 (E.D. La. 1984), afTd sub nom. Margaret S. v. Edwards, 794
F.2d 994 (5th Cir. 1986). But see Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1305 (N.D. II. 1978) (noting that
researchers do not have a fundamental right to perform fetal experimentation), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey,
599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979).
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practical purposes, "dead." '453 Thus, the ban would be considered arbitrary as the
state's interest in protecting life cannot extend beyond the "death" of the
embryo.4 4
Furthermore, all states have enacted the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, in
some form, which allows research on deceased children.455 Children must clearly
have greater symbolic value than embryos, as they represent greater potential than
an embryo which is not born, or even implanted, and has no hope of meaningful
life. Thus, state concerns regarding the symbolic value and dignity of the "dead"
embryo, cannot be rationally related to a state ban on embryological research
when the states permit research on dead children, since children have greater
symbolic value and greater potential for life.
Moreover, state laws do not rationally relate to protecting life, including the
potential life of the fetus, when state laws permit research on live children and
viable fetuses.45 Federal laws permit research using fetuses and children where
only "minimal risk" is present.457 "Minimal risk" occurs when the "risks of harm
anticipated in the proposed research are not greater, considering probability and
magnitude, than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the
performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. '458 Since
the embryo is, for all intents and purposes, "dead" because the progenitors do not
want to implant the embryo and do not wish to have it implanted in another
woman, embryological research can never exceed the risk "ordinarily encountered
in daily life"-that of disposal. Also, a state would rationally protect a child, with
actual legal rights, and a fetus, where the courts have indicated that the state has
a compelling interest after viability, at least to the same extent as an embryo that
does not have the potential for life without implantation.459 Therefore, total
prohibitions on embryological research are inconsistent with laws that permit
some research on live children and viable fetuses. Although this argument
supports all embiyological research, it clearly advances the theory that the state
does not have a rationally related basis for banning gene therapy, which provides
medical assistance to embryos.
453. Ozar, supra note 304, at 8; see id. (noting that "dead" includes not only the common definition of
dead but also a lack of ability to perform life functions, with or without medical intervention). Since an embryo
is unable to perform its life functions without implantation, it is "dead." Id.
454. See Margaret S. III, 597 F. Supp. at 675 (proposing the same rationale for fetal experimentation).
455. UNiF. ANATOmiCAL GriFr AcT, 8A U.L.A. 15-16 (West 1983 & Supp. 1987) (Table of Jurisdictions
wherein Act has been adopted); see Margaret S. 111, 597 F. Supp. at 675 (proposing the same rationale for fetal
experimentation).
456. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 32.1-162.18 (Michie 1992); see id. (permitting minors to consent to
research which does not represent more than a minor increase over minimal risk if it is also consented to by
the minor's legally authorized representative).
457. 45 C.F.R. § 46.11 l(a)(1) (1989); 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a) (1989); see 45 C.F.R. § 46.1 11 (a)(1) (1989)
(permitting children as research subjects); 45 C.F.R. § 46.208(a) (1989) (allowing fetuses as research subjects).
458. 45 C.F.R. § 46.102(g) (1989).
459. Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 307.
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Furthermore, arguments raised earlier regarding the significant respect shown
to life through the use of embryos in research negates the rational relationship to
denigrating the symbolic respect toward life that the state may claim to be
protecting. Moreover, the Davis v. Davis4w trial court indicated that if a state did
not recognize an interest in protecting a fetus through wrongful death statutes that
addressed embryos and did not protect fetuses from abortions, then the embryo,
a lesser developed fetus, could not be more greatly protected.46t Again, it seems
that while complete bans would not rationally relate to state interests, limiting
embryological research to support a state interest related to societal or health
concerns could be constitutional.
462
IV. CONCLUSION
Twenty-four states regulate fetal tissue research. Out of these twenty-four,
only ten states prohibit embryological research and other reproductive procedures
which could be classified as research. These state laws regulate gene therapy,
twinning, cryopreservation, preimplantation screening, cell line development and
basic research.
The wording of these statutes has been called into question by three recent
cases, which held that the terms "experimentation" and "nontherapeutic" were too
vague to withstand constitutional scrutiny. Many of the state bans which limit
embryological research could be considered unconstitutionally vague since
"experimentation" and "nontherapeutic" are found in the statutes without further
clarity. However, this defect can be corrected. 63
Even if the state laws are clarified, they could still face constitutional
challenges based on the right to privacy. The procedures which utilize embryos
are deeply connected to reproductive decision-making. Additionally, they are
associated with the time honored next-of-kin's quasi-property right in the
deceased's body. Combined with analogies to organ donation, those related con-
cepts indicate that embryological procedures should be encompassed in the
bundle of fundamental rights. Considering the impact complete bans would have
on reproductive decision-making and the beneficial nature of these procedures for
460. 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992), cert. denied sub noam. Stowe v. Davis, 509 U.S. 911 (1993).
461. Davis II, 842 S.W.2d at 594-96; see Lagod & Martin, supra note 8, at 307-09 (suggesting some
regulation of embryological research, as opposed to complete bans, including regulating commercialization
and the production of embryos for the sole purpose of research).
462. Eggen, supra note 31, at 708; see Wynn v. Scott, 449 F. Supp. 1302, 1322 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (holding
that a state law banning nontherapeutic experimentation on premature infants and live aborted fetuses passed
the rational basis test since the state has broad latitude in regulating social and health concerns, including fetal
research), aff'd sub nom. Wynn v. Carey, 599 F.2d 193 (7th Cir. 1979). This case can be distinguished from
Margaret S. I because the Margaret S. I ban prohibited experimentation on dead fetuses, while the Wynn ban
prohibited experimentation on live fetuses.
463. See supra notes 198-211 and accompanying text (discussing the cases which have invalidated
embryological research bans based on vagueness).
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the embryo and parents, as compared to the minimal interests the state has in a
spare, "dead" embryo with no chance of implantation, the parental interests out-
weigh the state's interest. Thus, the total prohibitions enacted by states against
embryological procedures should be found to violate the constitutional right to
privacy. 464
The First Amendment should also provide an avenue to invalidate total
prohibitions of embryological research. This proposal, while supported by various
Supreme Court opinions, has not been directly addressed by the Court. Whether
the bans are viewed as a precursor to speech in the form of research papers, as a
restriction of the means of acquiring new knowledge, or as a limitation on the
manner in which new knowledge is acquired, the state interests are not sub-
stantial. Additionally, the complete bans are not narrowly tailored to address the
state concerns so as to minimally interfere with speech. Thus, the right to conduct
research as protected under the umbrella of the First Amendment's freedom of
speech should invalidate prohibitions on embryological research. While the
constitutional protection of a right to scientific research would clearly provide a
basis for invalidating state restrictions on embryological research, this protection
is untested in the Supreme Court.465
Even if the courts find that embryological research is not rooted in the
fundamental rights associated with the right to privacy or the freedom of speech,
the total prohibitions are questionable under a rational basis review. However,
complete bans seem over inclusive in addressing the state concerns regarding the
protection of life and the showing of respect for life, The inconsistencies
regarding protecting the life of an embryo which will never be implanted while
promoting the donation of bodies after death further support the conclusion that
absolute prohibitions cannot rationally relate to the state interests involved! 
66
While total bans may be unconstitutional, the state concerns that prompted
regulation are valid and provide further impetus to enact national guidelines for
embryological research.467 These guidelines could incorporate valid restrictions
on embryological research which would address the legitimate state concerns in
464. See supra notes 212-381 and accompanying text (analyzing the constitutionality of complete bans
on embryological procedures according to the Fourteenth Amendment's right to privacy).
465. See supra notes 382-450 and accompanying text (exploring the right to research as a guarantee
included within the First Amendment's freedom of speech).
466. See supra notes 451-62 and accompanying text (discussing the inability of total state bans to
rationally relate to the state interests concerning embryological research).
467. See Baron, supra note 122, at 15 (suggesting that the federal regulation of fetal research would
provide uniformity and stability to the field); see supra notes 72-118 and accompanying text (discussing
various ethical viewpoints which provide impetus for state concerns). But see Eggen, supra note 31. at 687-89
(discussing the difficulties with enacting national guidelines); Dennis S. Karjala, A Legal Research Agenda
for the Human Genome Initiative, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 121, 156-57 (1992) (arguing that uniform national
guidelines may not be an appropriate answer if there are great differences over basic policy).
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a constitutional manner.4 In fact, the proposed NIH guidelines appear to address
some of the ethical concerns discussed earlier, such as limiting research to a
fourteen day window, prohibiting commercialization of embryological research,
and precluding research on embryos created solely for the purpose of research.
Many commentators have called for clear, precise policies, often to avoid the risk
of a chilling effect on embryological research. 4 9 These guidelines, combined with
the invalidation of state bans on embryological research, should provide a bright
beacon to humankind by permitting research which gives such promise and hope
to women, men, and children.
468. Right to Research, supra note 261, at 1256-67; see id. (listing various restrictions which would be
constitutional, including requiring informed consent or prohibiting research on viable fetuses, children or
incompetent persons).
469. Fletcher & Ryan, supra note 5, at 132; Clifford Grobstein et al., Frozen Embryos: Policy Issues,
312 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1584, 1586 (1985).
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